Economics and politics of international investment agreements by HORN, Henrik & TANGERÅS, Thomas
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RSCAS 2017/19 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
Global Governance Programme-261 
Economics and Politics of International Investment 
Agreements 
 
Henrik Horn and Thomas Tangerås 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
European University Institute 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
Global Governance Programme 
 
 
 
Economics and Politics of International Investment Agreements 
 
  
 
Henrik Horn and Thomas Tangerås 
EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2017/19 
 
   
This text may be downloaded only for personal research purposes. Additional reproduction for other 
purposes, whether in hard copies or electronically, requires the consent of the author(s), editor(s).  
If cited or quoted, reference should be made to the full name of the author(s), editor(s), the title, the 
working paper, or other series, the year and the publisher. 
 
 
 
ISSN 1028-3625 
© Henrik Horn and Thomas Tangerås, 2017 
Printed in Italy, March 2017 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 
I – 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy 
www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Publications/ 
www.eui.eu 
cadmus.eui.eu 
  
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS), created in 1992 and directed by 
Professor Brigid Laffan, aims to develop inter-disciplinary and comparative research and to promote 
work on the major issues facing the process of integration and European society. 
The Centre is home to a large post-doctoral programme and hosts major research programmes and 
projects, and a range of working groups and ad hoc initiatives. The research agenda is organised 
around a set of core themes and is continuously evolving, reflecting the changing agenda of European 
integration and the expanding membership of the European Union.  
Details of the research of the Centre can be found on:  
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Research/ 
Research publications take the form of Working Papers, Policy Papers, Policy Briefs, Distinguished 
Lectures, Research Project Reports and Books.  
Most of these are also available on the RSCAS website:  
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Publications/ 
The EUI and the RSCAS are not responsible for the opinion expressed by the author(s).  
 
 
The Global Governance Programme at the EUI 
The Global Governance Programme is one of the flagship programmes of the Robert Schuman Centre 
for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute (EUI). It aims to: build a community of 
outstanding professors and scholars, produce high quality research and, engage with the world of 
practice through policy dialogue. At the Global Governance Programme, established and early career 
scholars research, write on and discuss, within and beyond academia, issues of global governance, 
focussing on four broad and interdisciplinary areas: European, Transnational and Global Governance; 
Global Economics; Europe in the World; and Cultural Pluralism. 
The Programme also aims to contribute to the fostering of present and future generations of policy and 
decision makers through its unique executive training programme, the Academy of Global 
Governance, where theory and “real world” experience meet. At the Academy, executives, policy 
makers, diplomats, officials, private sector professionals and academics, have the opportunity to meet, 
share views and debate with leading academics, top-level officials, heads of international organisations 
and senior executives, on topical issues relating to governance.  
For more information: http://globalgovernanceprogramme.eui.eu 
 
 
 
  
Abstract 
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on countries’ unilateral commitment possibilities and the direction of investment flows. Foreign 
investors benefit from agreements between developed countries at the expense of the rest of society, 
but not in the case of agreements between developed and developing countries.  
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1 Introduction
International investment agreements are state-to-state treaties that aim to promote foreign direct
investment (FDI) by protecting investors against adverse eﬀects from host country policy measures.
The agreements typically require host countries to compensate foreign investors in case of expro-
priation or measures with similar eﬀects, and they contain a range of other provisions, including
non-discrimination of foreign investment. The agreements also typically include dispute settlement
mechanisms that enable foreign investors to litigate against host countries through legal processes
outside the domestic legal system, so called investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS).
The ﬁrst investment agreements appeared in late 1950s, but most of the 2 600 treaties that
currently are in force were formed after 1990.1 A majority of the agreements exclusively address
investment protection, but it has become increasingly common also for preferential trade agreements
to encompass such protection. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was one of
the ﬁrst trade agreements to do so, and investment protection has since become a standard feature
of EU and US preferential trade agreements.
Investment agreements have until recently been formed without much political opposition, but
some agreements have recently come under intense ﬁre. The debate has concerned in particular the
role of investment protection in "mega-regional" preferential trade agreements–the Trans-Paciﬁc
Partnership (TPP), the Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), and
the EU-US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Central to this critique is the
fact that these agreements cover not only direct expropriation, but also cases where host countries
take regulatory measures that signiﬁcantly reduce the value of the investment to its owners without
taking over ownership of the assets–so called indirect (or regulatory) expropriation. Critics argue
that these (and other) provision are so generally formulated that almost any regulatory policy with
adverse consequences for foreign investors could be interpreted to require compensation. This is
seen to be particularly troublesome given the possibility for investors to use the very potent ISDS
mechanisms to enforce the substantive obligations in the agreements. It is argued that signatory
states will refrain from pursuing legitimate public policy goals to avoid litigation, that is, the
agreements will cause "regulatory chill."2
This skeptical view has been fuelled by a number of actual litigations that have made headlines:
TransCanada Corporation recently declared its intention to sue the US under NAFTA for US$ 15
billion as compensation for the decision by the Obama Administration to disallow the construction
of the Keystone XL pipe line; Phillip Morris has litigated against several countries over the tobacco
plain packaging legislation; Spain is facing a large number of litigations for the withdrawal of
renewable energy support schemes during the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008, and similar cases have been
brought against Italy and the Czech Republic; Germany is being sued by the energy company
1http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA.
2Several other aspects of the adjudication system are also severely criticized, such as the lack of independence of
arbitrators, the lack of appeal possibilities and excessive conﬁdentiality.
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Vattenfall for losses caused by the country’s decision to shut down nuclear power in the wake of the
Fukushima disaster.
The policy debate raises a number of questions: How should investment agreements be designed?
Do appropriately designed agreements cause regulatory chill? Do they resolve the perceived over-
regulation and underinvestment problems? Who beneﬁts and who loses from the formation of the
agreements? The economic literature sheds very little light on these issues. The purpose of this
paper is to contribute to ﬁlling this lacuna by analyzing the optimal design and implications of
agreements that compensate investors for regulatory expropriations.
An investment agreement need to address the interaction between two distortions in the case
of regulatory expropriations: On the one hand, the host country disregard of foreign investor in-
terests when deciding on regulation–this is what causes a tendency toward overregulation, and
thus a potential beneﬁt from protection–and on the other hand, the potential adverse eﬀects from
investment, which motivates the existence of a regulatory regime. The interaction between these
distortions can cause overregulation and underinvestment, and thus creates a scope for an invest-
ment agreement. To capture this interaction, we consider an investment agreement between two
countries in a generalized version of the canonical regulatory takings model of investment protec-
tion.3 One central feature of our approach is that we focus on voluntary, Pareto eﬃcient investment
agreements. Another is that we for the most part constrain the agreements under study to share
certain basic features with actual agreements. This is in our view a natural starting point for the
analysis of investment agreements, but as explained below, the small related literature on investment
agreements has mainly followed diﬀerent approaches in this regard.
At the outset of the interaction, competitive ﬁrms make irreversible foreign direct investment
in production facilities. The investments create beneﬁts to the host country, but might also create
negative externalities of unknown magnitude at the time of the investment. These externalities
can render production ex post undesirable from a domestic, and possibly also from a joint welfare
perspective. The shock could capture a broad range of exogenous events, for instance the arrival
of information concerning adverse environmental or heath consequences of production, but we will
simply denote the realizations as "regulatory shocks." Upon observing its country-speciﬁc shock,
each host country decides whether to permit or to disallow production. Production and consumption
occurs if there is no regulation. The private investment is eﬀectively lost if the country instead
regulates the industry, although there is no formal take-over of the ownership of the assets. The
host country disregards the adverse eﬀects for investors. The outcome is likely to be ineﬃcient
absent investment protection, and it might feature too little investment and excessive regulation
relative to the ﬁrst best. Hence, there appears to be scope for an investment agreement.
We represent investment agreement as a set of negotiated rules specifying payments to foreign
investors as a function of regulatory decisions, and possibly other factors. Importantly, we require
3The "regulatory takings" concept stems from the Fifth Amendment to the US Constitution stating "...nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." See Section 1.1 for a discussion of the literature.
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compensation schemes to be congruent with core features of actual agreements. For instance,
ﬁrms are only eligible for compensation in case of regulation. Compensation must be non-negative
and based on, but cannot exceed ﬁrms’ foregone operating proﬁts. But we also identify plausible
circumstances under which our imposed contract restrictions do not constrain agreements in terms
of eﬃciency.
The ﬁrst issue to be addressed is the key policy question of whether investment agreements
cause regulatory chill. We demonstrate that Pareto optimal investment agreements never yield
underregulation from a joint welfare perspective–there will be no "global regulatory chill." When
compensation is limited to at most each ﬁrm’s operating proﬁt, it is always optimal for the host
country to regulate when doing so is ex post eﬃcient. Hence, agreements induce either ex post
eﬃcient regulation or ineﬃcient overregulation. They do yield less regulation than would result
without any agreement, but such "domestic regulatory chill" is simply the price the host country
must pay to promote foreign investment. These results hold for a large variety of settings, for
instance, they are independent of the market structure and only requires that compensation be
non-negative.
A related policy issue is when investors should, and when they should not, be compensated in
case of regulation. We show that a simple "carve-out" scheme by which ﬁrms receive full com-
pensation for all regulatory shocks below, and no compensation above, a speciﬁed threshold, is
suﬃcient to implement any Pareto optimal investment agreement, when compensation is required
to be proportional to operating proﬁt. This threshold level is referred to as the level of investment
protection. This ﬁnding simpliﬁes the subsequent analysis of the formation and the implications of
investment agreements considerably, since the agreements can be characterized in terms of the level
of investment protection they oﬀer.
We next consider the capacity of an investment agreement to address the distortions in our
setting under ideal circumstances, that is, if designed to maximize the joint welfare of the par-
ties. We identify a non-trivial set of circumstances under which an agreement can implement the
unconstrained eﬃcient outcome, despite fulﬁlling our contract restrictions.
To shed light on the politics of investment agreements we then examine the distribution of the
beneﬁts and costs from an agreement. To this end we distinguish between two archetypical forms
of agreements. One is a "North-South agreement" between a developed and a developing country,
that serves to stimulate investment from North to South.4 We assume that South is unable to
make credible unilateral commitments to investment protection. Such an agreement, if formed,
by necessity increases domestic welfare in South–that is, the welfare generated in, and accruing
to, South. These beneﬁts eﬀectively emanate from the external legal enforcement of investment
protection commitments that the agreement oﬀers: South would have nothing to gain from an
4The vast majority of bilateral investment agreements are between a developed and a developing country. For
instance, the US has approximately 60 investment treaties with low and middle income developing countries; see the
above-mentioned UNCTAD website.
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agreement if it already had full commitment possibilities because then its unilaterally chosen level
of investment protection would internalize all relevant eﬀects of FDI. This mechanism corresponds
closely to the "commitment approach" to trade agreements, which sees trade agreements as a tool
to help governments withstand domestic protectionist pressures.
The other archetypical treaty is a "North-North agreement." Such an agreement does not im-
prove commitment possibilities. The gains instead stem from the bilateral internalization of the
externalities from regulation that the agreement allows. This mechanism is much in line with the
standard view of trade agreements, which sees these agreements as means of escaping Prisoner
Dilemma-like situations. The improved investment protection that a North-North agreement oﬀers
beneﬁts investors in both countries, since the agreement entails more investment protection than is
optimal from a domestic welfare point of view in both countries.
We believe these ﬁndings are informative regarding the politics of investment protection. The
results suggest that symmetric agreements such as CETA and TTIP (and to some extent also the
TPP) would beneﬁt foreign investors, but reduce consumer welfare in a broad sense of the term.
This might explain why the industry in general favors these agreements, while at the same time
there is considerable popular resistance to their formation. Our ﬁndings also predict that there
should be less opposition to North-South agreements, since the beneﬁts to a larger extent accrue to
the broader public in the host country. Again, this seems broadly compatible with what is observed,
in that there appears to be much less popular discontent with investment agreements in developing
countries than with the mega-regional agreements.
Yet another contentious policy issue with regard to the design of compensation mechanisms
in investment agreements, is whether changes in political preferences should be treated as any
other risk in investment agreements. A simple reformulation of our model allows us to examine
certain aspects of this issue. We assume that there are two types of shocks that aﬀect regulation:
an exogenous regulatory shock, such as a scientiﬁc discovery, and a shock to political preferences
concerning the regulatory objective, such as a change in government. Government preferences are
unknown at the investment stage, but are realized simultaneously with the scientiﬁc shock. We show
that an ex ante optimal investment agreement that is formed behind a "veil of ignorance," allows
governments that are more sensitive to regulatory shocks to intervene for a larger range of shocks
without paying compensation. Optimal agreements are thus sensitive to "democratic" concerns in
this regard.
The remainder of the paper extends the analysis in a number of directions. First, investment
agreements typically include provisions that prohibit less favorable treatment of foreign than of
domestic investment when these are undertaken in "like circumstances." We show that host gov-
ernments can beneﬁt from including such National Treatment clauses in investment agreements as
a commitment tool to enforce stricter regulation of domestic industries.
Second, investment agreements typically include stricter rules for direct expropriation compared
to the rules for regulatory expropriations, in that the former often does not allow the general ex-
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ceptions that apply to the latter type of expropriations. However, allowing uncompensated direct
expropriation can actually enhance eﬃciency, since this helps separate the problem of correcting
investment incentives from that of ensuring ex post optimal regulation incentives: Direct expropri-
ation and regulation have the same consequences for the targeted ﬁrms. But once a government
has seized an asset it will eﬀectively internalize the consequences of its regulatory decisions for the
return from the asset. This mechanism depends crucially on the regulatory shock being observable,
however. Under asymmetric information, a host country would always claim that the realization of
the shock allows it to seize assets without compensation. Full compensation for all direct expropri-
ation is the easiest way to avoid private investment being driven completely out of the market in
this case.
In a third extension we identify circumstances under which an investment agreement can imple-
ment a fully eﬃcient outcome when the industry consists of a strategically behaving monopoly.
A fourth extension assumes that the regulatory shock is private information to the host country.
A mechanism with zero compensation for large shocks is then not incentive compatible, since the
host country could regulate at no domestic cost by exaggerating the severity of the regulatory shock.
Incentive compatibility instead requires the country to pay a ﬁxed compensation for all regulation.
This compensation would generally depend on the cost to the host country of allowing production
and not on foregone operating proﬁt.
In a ﬁnal extension we allow for more general compensation schemes than those commonly in-
cluded in investment agreements, in particular for the purpose of further exploring the consequences
of asymmetric information. Incentive compatible compensation schemes usually imply excess com-
pensation by the host country (punitive damages) or third-party participation; see our review below
of the literature. We show how to implement the fully eﬃcient outcome by means of a relative per-
formance scheme that involves neither punitive damages, nor third-party payments.
1.1 Relation to the literature
The informal economic literature on expropriation of foreign investment dates back at least to
Keynes (1924), and includes e.g. Vernon’s (1971) "obsolescing bargaining" theory. Eaton and
Gersovitz (1983, 1984) are among the ﬁrst to study expropriation in a conventional neoclassical
framework. Several contributions focus on implicit mechanisms rather than international treaties
for reducing investor-state hold-up problems. For instance, Dixit (1988) informally sketches an
incomplete information model of the interaction between a sequence of potential investors and a host
country, in a situation where the host country preferences regarding expropriation are unknown to
investors (Raﬀ, 1992, formally analyzes such a setting). Dixit (1988) shows how a host country that
would beneﬁt in the short run from expropriating might refrain from doing so in an eﬀort to persuade
investors it has other preferences. Cole and English (1991) show how the incentives for expropriation
can be kept at bay by the use of trigger strategies in an inﬁnite horizon model. Thomas and Worral
(1994) and Schnitzer (1999) examine how other forms of self-enforcing agreements between investors
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and host governments can remedy hold-up problems. Dixit (2011) discusses a range of issues related
to insecurity of property rights and FDI, and also provides extensive reviews of both the theoretical
and the empirical literature.
There are two strands of mostly very recent literature that directly address the design and impact
of speciﬁc obligations in investment agreements.5 One strand considers implications of exogenously
imposed investment agreements. Janeba (2016) analyzes whether national or international courts
should arbitrate disputes between foreign investors and states. The paper focuses on two sources
of deﬁciencies in the arbitration process under investment agreements. First, litigation costs can
dissuade host countries from pursuing eﬃcient policies, causing a form of regulatory chill. Second,
international courts are more prone to rule in favor of investors than domestic courts. Janeba (2016)
shows how the incentive for a country to form an investment agreement depends on the losses from
unfavorable determinations, and the beneﬁts for its own foreign investors from discrimination in
their favor in the partner country.
Kohler and Stähler (2016) examine consequences of a particular interpretation of the "legitimate
expectations" notion that sometimes has been employed by arbitration panels. It holds that past
regulatory policies can create legitimate investor expectations about subsequent regulations, and
thus eﬀectively link regulatory decisions across time. The authors show in a two-period framework
how such intertemporal linkages can reduce overregulation and increase aggregate welfare over
time. This type of agreement is then compared with an agreement that instead imposes a National
Treatment rule that equalizes the protection of foreign and domestic ﬁrms. The authors identify
circumstances under which this non-discrimination rule yields higher aggregate welfare than the
former mechanism.
Schjelderup and Stähler (2016) investigate a two-period regulation problem in which a host
country taxes a foreign investor to reduce a negative investment externality and raise tax revenue.
The second period externalities are unknown and might require the host country to increase the
tax. An arbitration mechanism compels the host country to set its taxes at a Pigouvian level and
might request the country to compensate the ﬁrm for tax increases. The authors show that the
mechanism could cause overinvestment and has potentially ambiguous welfare implications.
Konrad (2016) considers the strategic incentives to invest in order to reduce the probability of
environmental regulation. Increased investment protection beneﬁts investors, but exacerbates an
already existing overinvestment and underregulation problem. Konrad (2016) sees these results as
one explanation for why ﬁrms favor investment protection and why those mechanisms are disliked
by environmentalists and other interest groups.
5There are other, but to this paper more tangential contributions. For instance, Markusen (1998, 2001) discusses
pros and cons of investment agreements from a developing country perspective. Turrini and Urban (2000, 2008)
analyze the role of a multilateral investment agreement. Bergstrand and Egger (2013) depict a investment agreement
as an exogenous reduction in the capital cost of FDI in a three-factor, three country general equilibrium setting. It
is shown how the welfare gains of investment agreements and preferential trading agreements depend on factors such
as country size and trade costs.
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The welfare analyses in these papers in each case involves a comparison of an investment agree-
ment with exogenously given characteristics to some outside option. There is no analysis of whether
an alternative design of the agreement could make it welfare enhancing and acceptable to the parties
if the proposed agreement is not, nor is there any discussion about the relevant alternative. For in-
stance, it is not clear why the host country would enter into an agreement in Konrad’s (2016) model
in light of the fact that increased investment protection reduces host country welfare. Conversely,
even if the studied agreements would increase aggregate welfare they might still not come about,
since they could have adverse consequences for some of the parties. Our paper diﬀers from the
above contributions by considering the endogenous formation of an agreement that fulﬁlls realistic
contract restrictions and accounts for reasonable participation constraints of the contracting parties.
The second strand of literature examines the optimal design of investment agreements. Aisbett
et al (2010a) incorporate an imperfectly unobservable regulatory shock in a standard regulatory
takings model. Key contributions to the takings literature implicitly assume that the incentives to
invest and to regulate are undistorted.6 Aisbett et al (2010a) show how full eﬃciency can be achieved
also with distorted incentives to regulate if the host country can overcompensate the industry for its
losses. Aisbett et al (2010b) examine the implications of a National Treatment (NT) provision that
prevents a host country from requesting up-front payments from foreign ﬁrms prior to investing.
An NT rule can render broader exemptions from the compensation requirements desirable in case of
regulation. Stähler (2016) derives a mechanism that can achieve the fully eﬃcient outcome when the
regulatory shock is unobservable. Eﬃciency is achieved by breaking the payment balance between
the host country and ﬁrms.
Our paper diﬀers from these three contributions in several regards. Most importantly, all three
studies rely on compensation schemes that are not found in actual investment agreements: subsi-
dization and overcompensation are typically not part of treaties, and the agreements do not give
any scope for breaking the budget balance by payments to or from third parties. Furthermore, none
of these three papers discuss distributional eﬀects of compensation schemes, and consequently not
the incentives to form the agreements.
2 Salient features of investment agreements
The investment agreements under scrutiny here should be distinguished from state-to-state tax
treaties and standard commercial contracts formed between a host country and an individual in-
vestor. There is currently no multilateral investment agreement, despite the attempt by the OECD
to launch such an agreement in 1998; the World Trade Organization Agreement contains certain
6See Blume et al (1984) and Miceli and Segerson (1994). In such instances, a compensation mechanism can only
reduce welfare. Hermalin (1995) demonstrates how taxes and other sophisticated compensation mechanisms can
achieve the ﬁrst-best outcome in a takings model with distorted investment and regulation decisions. See Miceli and
Segerson (2011) for a comprehensive survey. We discuss some of these papers in more detail in Section 5.5.
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provision regarding trade-related investment, but no protection against direct or indirect expro-
priations. The very large number of investment agreements in force diﬀer in coverage, and the
associated case law is highly fragmented, with similar provisions interpreted very diﬀerently by
diﬀerent panels. Nevertheless, the more prominent negotiated agreements, such as NAFTA, the
mega-regional agreements, and the EU and US "model agreements," share certain features.7
First, most agreements address the treatment of investments after establishment without pro-
viding pre-establishment rights.8
Second, the agreements almost always request non-discriminatory treatment of foreign invest-
ment (and sometimes also investors) in the sense that host country treatment of foreign investment
should be "no less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances" to its own investors (Na-
tional Treatment), or to third country investors (Most-Favored Nation Treatment).9 ,10
Third, investment agreements typically specify that foreign investment should be given at least
a "minimum standard of treatment." A common part of these undertakings is a commitment to
provide "fair and equitable treatment." The vagueness of this concept has caused a number of
contentious interpretations in case law.
Fourth, investment agreements almost invariably distinguish between direct and "indirect" ex-
propriation, with the latter referring to "an action or series of actions by a Party [that] has an
eﬀect equivalent to direct expropriation without formal transfer of title or outright seizure." A
common restriction is that expropriations are only allowed if they are for a public purpose, are
non-discriminatory, are in accordance with due process of law, and if investors receive "prompt,
adequate, and eﬀective compensation." Agreements occasionally provide further speciﬁcations that
provide guidance for the interpretation of "indirect expropriation". For instance, "the extent to
which the government action interferes with distinct, reasonable investment-backed expectations"
or "the character of the government action" determines whether a state intervention represents
an expropriation. Investment agreements also increasingly include restrictions on the ambit of the
indirect expropriation clauses, so called "carve-outs.". For instance:
"Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintain-
ing or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with this Chapter that it considers
appropriate to ensure that investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner
sensitive to environmental, health or other regulatory objectives..."
and
7See Dolzer and Schreuer (2012) for a comprehensive overview of international investment law.
8According to UNCTAD (2015, p.111), less than ten percent of IIAs include pre-establishment rights.
9Unless otherwise stated, the quotations in this Section are taken from the US Model Bilateral Investment Treaty
2012. They appear verbatim in Chapter 9 of TPP, and to large extent also in Chapter 11 of NAFTA.
10There are signiﬁcant exemptions from these requirements in some agreements for certain types of discriminatory
measures, or for certain industries.
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"[n]on-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and applied to
protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety and the envi-
ronment, do not constitute indirect expropriations, except in rare circumstances."
A standard speciﬁcation concerning the required magnitude for compensation in case of expro-
priation is that it should be equivalent to the "fair market value" of the expropriated investment.
When interpreting this and related concepts, arbitration panels normally seek guidance in the gen-
eral principles concerning state responsibility in Customary International Law. These hold that in
case of illegal acts,
"...reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act
and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act
had not been committed"11
and
"[t]he compensation shall cover any ﬁnancially assessable damage including loss of proﬁts
insofar as it is established."12
Arbitration panels have assessed fair market value in a variety of ways, some forward-looking (such
as discounted cash ﬂows), and some backward-looking (incurred investment costs, for instance).
Importantly for what follows, the purpose of the payment is to compensate the injured party for its
losses, not to punish the responsible state: "A tribunal shall not award punitive damages."13
Finally, many investment agreements include a compulsory dispute settlement mechanism.
These mechanisms diﬀer from those in trade agreements in several fundamental respects. For
instance, they do not only allow state-to-state disputes, but also allow foreign investors to litigate
against host country governments (ISDS). Another diﬀerence is that the enforcement of rulings is
much more potent than in trade agreements, since prevailing investors often can request courts at
home, in the host country, as well as in third countries, to seize assets belonging to the host country
in case the losing state does not willingly abide by the ruling.
As stated above, the purpose of the paper is to examine the design and implications of investment
agreements constrained to share certain basic features with actual agreements. We therefore impose
the following restrictions in most of the analysis to follow:
Contract Restrictions Feasible agreements have the following features:
(1) Investment decisions and regulation decisions are left at the discretion of investors and the host
country, respectively.
11This often quoted passage is from the determination by the Permanent Court of International Justice in The
Factory at Chorzów case 1928.
12Article 36, International Law Commission (2001). A footnote is omitted.
13Crawford (2002, p. 219).
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(2) Agreements impose no taxation or performance requirement on investors;
(3) There are no payments to or from outside parties;
(4) Compensation is non-negative and paid only in case of regulation; and
(5) Compensation is proportional to, and not larger than, foregone operating proﬁts.
These restrictions ensure that feasible agreements cannot subsidize investment, nor impose punitive
damages on host countries, since compensation cannot exceed foregone operating proﬁts and can
only be paid in case of regulation. This does not preclude other legal arrangements between host
countries and individual ﬁrms or the industry, but these would then be subsumed in the domestic
welfare and proﬁt functions. The main deviation from these restrictions occurs in Section 5.5, where
we allow compensation to diverge from operating proﬁts.
The ﬁve restrictions above reﬂect the fact that investment agreements typically are long-term
incomplete insurance contracts that cover a broad range of industries. This broad scope can explain
why investment decisions and regulation decisions are decentralized, agreements impose no taxation
or performance requirements on investors and why compensation is paid only in case of regulation.
When governments seek to provide more ﬁne-tuned incentives for investment, this is done through
commercial agreements with speciﬁc ﬁrms or industries. An important reason for why agreements
do not rely on payments to and from outside parties is probably a lack of third party institutions
willing to accept this role.
The most debatable constraint is Contract Restriction (5). From a contract point of view it
might of course be better for the countries to invoke more general compensation schemes. We indeed
examine such schemes in an extension to the main ﬁndings. In reality, contract stipulations usually
relate compensation payments to notions of the market value of the investment and speciﬁcally
to losses of proﬁt in certain cases. In this respect, the design of investment agreements reﬂects
the above-mentioned basic principles concerning the limits to state responsibility. A consistent
interpretation of such provisions is to assume that compensation should be proportional to, but at
most equal to, operating proﬁt. Based on this set of restrictions, we will show that it is optimal to
pay ﬁrms full compensation whenever they are entitled to damage payments.
Finally, we assume that agreements are perfectly enforceable. This seems reasonable considering
the strong enforcement possibilities oﬀered by the ISDS mechanisms. It can also be noted that
perfect enforcement is a well-established assumption e.g. in the trade agreement literature, despite
much weaker enforcement mechanisms in those agreements.
3 The setting
Consider an industry in country i consisting entirely of ﬁrms from country j. The interaction in
the industry occurs in stages. The foreign ﬁrms ﬁrst make simultaneous irreversible investments in
production facilities. The host country is subsequently hit by a country-speciﬁc exogenous shock
that aﬀects the country’s beneﬁts from production. Having observed the shock, the host country
10
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decides whether to allow production, or to regulate by shutting down the industry. In the ﬁnal
stage, there is production and consumption unless the industry is regulated.
The two countries are interrelated in that the decision on regulation in country i aﬀects the
proﬁts of investors from j. This is the direct eﬀect on the value of the investment. We assume
that regulatory decisions are strategically independent, however. This assumption simpliﬁes that
exposition, and allows us to focus on what we see as the most relevant aspects of investment
agreements. For the sake of expositional convenience, the main text uses a standard model of a
perfect competitive representative ﬁrm. Most of the results are derived in the Appendix using a
signiﬁcantly more general framework that admits imperfect competition, ﬁrm asymmetries, etc.
3.1 Product market competition
The representative consumer in country i maximizes a quasi-linear utility Ωi(zi) + z0 over the
consumption zi of the domestic good subject to the budget constraint pizi+z0 ≤ Υ
i, where pi is the
unit price of the domestic good, z0 is a numeraire good, and Υ
i the exogenously given income. Ωi is
continuous, strictly increasing and strictly concave in the relevant domain, and Ωi(0) = 0. Income
is suﬃciently large that the consumer always purchases both goods in strictly positive amounts.
The total production cost of a representative foreign ﬁrm j is Cj(xi, ki), where xi is its production
volume, and ki its investment. The cost function has standard properties: C
j(0, ki) = 0; C
j
x > 0;
Cjxx > 0; C
j
k < 0; C
j
kk > 0; C
j
xk < 0; and C
j
xxC
j
kk ≥ C
j
xkC
j
kx.
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The market is for the most part assumed to be perfectly competitive, so the representative
ﬁrm maximizes proﬁt pixi − C
j(xi, ki) over production, taking the price in market i as given. The
equilibrium output Xi(ki) and market-price P
i(ki) are in standard fashion deﬁned by
Ωiz(X
i(ki)) = C
j
x(X
i(ki), ki) and P
i(ki) ≡ Ω
i
z(X(ki)), (1)
withXik(ki) > 0 and P
i
k(ki) < 0; see Appendix A.1 for the derivations of these and other comparative
statics. To distinguish between the maximization problem facing the price-taking investors, and the
problem of maximizing aggregate welfare, we deﬁne two reduced form expressions for operating
proﬁts:
Πˆj(pi, ki) ≡ piX
i(ki)−C
j(Xi(ki), ki)
Πj(ki) ≡ Πˆ
j(P i(ki), ki).
The total welfare that the host country derives from production in the industry–its "domestic
welfare"–is
Si(ki,θi) ≡ Ω
i(Xi(ki))− P
i(ki)X
i(ki) + Ψ
i(ki, θi),
where the ﬁrst two terms represent conventional consumer surplus (disregarding the constant income
Υi). The last term is a production externality, the magnitude of which depends on a stochastic
14Subscripts attached to function operators denote partial derivatives.
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shock θi ∈ [θi, θ¯i]. The production externality Ψ
i can either be positive or negative, but a larger
shock θi is deﬁned always to correspond to a more negative externality: Ψ
i
θ < 0. This negative
eﬀect dominates for suﬃciently large shocks, in which case the host country will regulate absent an
investment agreement. In contrast to much of the takings literature, we allow the externality also
to be a function of the investment, which for simplicity is concave: Ψikk ≤ 0.
High realizations of θi could represent the arrival of information concerning adverse environ-
mental or health consequences of the production process, as in the case of the Fukushima disaster,
or concerning product characteristics, as in the case of tobacco. The model could also capture a
situation where a host country has made implicit or explicit promises to pursue a certain policy, but
where a ﬁnancial shock induces the country to change its policy, such as in the case of the subsidies
to renewable energy in Spain. We will not adopt any particular interpretation, but simply denote
it as a "regulatory shock."
Several comments on the model are in order. The model allows us to distinguish between
pecuniary beneﬁts from production stemming from local consumption, Ωi(zi)−pizi, and production
externalities Ψi(ki, θi). The model is also compatible with positive externalities from investment in
the form of employment, technological spill-overs, learning-by-doing by the work-force, etc. Such
eﬀects would be subsumed in the expression for externalities Ψi(ki, θi). For instance, we could
assume that Ψi(ki, θi) ≡ Λ
i(Xi(ki))−Φ
i(Xi(ki), θi), where Λ
i(Xi(ki)) captures the externalities for
the local economy from foreign production, and Φi(Xi(ki), θi) the adverse eﬀects of the regulatory
problem that stochastically aﬀects the economy (Φiθ > 0).
Second, it is commonplace to refer to the beneﬁts of foreign direct investment when pointing
to the positive eﬀects of foreign ﬁrms in the local economy. Some of the local employment and
business eﬀects certainly are directly related to the investment because they materialize during the
construction of the plant. These speciﬁc externalities are sunk when the country decides whether
to regulate and we therefore assume them to be zero. Instead, Ψi(ki, θi) refers to production
externalities that vanish in case of regulation. Since both positive and negative externalities are
likely to increase in the investment ki, we allow the marginal production externality to be positive
or negative, and to depend on the shock: Ψik(ki, θi) ≷ 0.
3.2 Regulation absent investment protection
Host country i observes θi and then decides whether to allow production or to regulate the industry.
Domestic welfare equals Si(ki, θi) and foreign ﬁrms make the operating proﬁts Π
j(ki) when pro-
duction is allowed. By assumption, all externalities from the investment are related to production,
so regulation by country i implies that Ψi = 0, there is no consumption, and operating proﬁts are
zero. Let domestic welfare be strictly positive for any ki > 0 if the regulatory shock equals θi, but
very negative if the shock equals θ¯i. The regulatory shock Θ
i(ki) for which the host country is
12
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indiﬀerent between allowing production and regulating then is given by
Si(ki,Θ
i) ≡ 0. (2)
Absent investment protection, the host country will regulate production if and only if θi > Θ
i(ki),
since Siθ < 0.
We will use the unweighted sum of welfare of the two countries that is generated in country i,
Si(ki, θi)+Π
j(ki), as a benchmark to measure the extent to which various policy regimes eﬃciently
exploit the potential gains from cooperation. This is what a negotiated settlement would achieve
if the countries were perfectly symmetric, or if they had access to side payments, and we therefore
denote this "joint" or "global" welfare. The eﬃcient threshold for regulation ΘiG(ki) is thus given
by
Si(ki,Θ
iG) + Πj(ki) ≡ 0.
It follows from Πj(ki) > 0 and Sθ < 0 that Θ
iG(ki) > Θ
i(ki). Consequently:
Observation 1 Absent investment protection, host country i tends to regulate more frequently for
any investment level ki than what would maximize joint welfare. There will be:
(a) eﬃcient production for θi ≤ Θ
i(ki);
(b) overregulation from a joint welfare point of view for θi ∈ (Θ
i(ki),Θ
iG(ki)); and
(c) eﬃcient regulation for θi ≥ Θ
iG(ki).
3.3 Investment absent investment protection
Individual ﬁrms are suﬃciently small to disregard their individual impacts on the probability of
regulation and on the market price, but they rationally foresee the equilibrium levels of both. The
expected proﬁt of the representative ﬁrm is F i(θˆi)Πˆ
j(pi, ki)−R
j(ki), where θˆi is the threshold value
for regulation, and Rj(ki) is the investment cost; R
j(0) = 0, Rjk > 0, and R
j
kk ≥ 0. The associated
ﬁrst-order condition yields investment kˆi as an increasing function K
i(θˆi) of the foreseen cut-oﬀ
level for regulation θˆi:
−F i(θˆi)C
j
k(X
i(Ki),Ki)−Rjk(K
i) ≡ 0. (3)
The eﬃcient level of investment maximizesZ θˆi
θi
[Si(ki, θi) + Π
j(ki)]dF
i(θi)−R
j(ki) (4)
given θˆi. The associated ﬁrst-order condition gives the eﬃcient investment as a function K
iG(θˆi) of
the foreseen cut-oﬀ level for regulation θˆi:
−F i(θˆi)C
j
k(X
i(KiG),KiG)−Rjk(K
iG) +
Z θˆi
θi
Ψik(K
iG,θi)dF
i(θi) ≡ 0. (5)
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A comparison of (3) and (5), using Kiθ > 0, yields
Ki(θˆi) < K
iG(θˆi) iﬀ
Z θˆi
θi
Ψik(K
iG(θˆi),θi)dF
i(θi) > 0. (6)
Hence:
Observation 2 Absent investment protection, ﬁrms underinvest for any regulatory threshold θˆi
relative to what would maximize joint welfare, if and only if the marginal expected production exter-
nality is positive evaluated at the eﬃcient investment KiG(θˆi).
3.4 The ineﬃciency of the outcome absent investment protection
Absent investment protection, investments will be chosen to maximize expected proﬁt given the
equilibrium threshold for regulation: kNi = K
i(θNi ). The threshold for regulation will in turn
maximize the host country’s ex post welfare given the equilibrium investment: θNi = Θ
i(kNi ). It
follows that θNi represents a Nash equilibrium if and only if θ
N
i = Θ
i(Ki(θNi )). To ensure the
existence of a unique equilibrium, we assume throughout the analysis that if θ′ = Θi(Ki(θ′)), then
θˆi < Θ
i(Ki(θˆi)) iﬀ θˆi < θ
′, (7)
and we make the corresponding assumption regarding the function ΘiG. These assumptions corre-
spond to the "stability" conditions used for instance in oligopoly models to rule out counter-intuitive
comparative statics properties.15
Condition (7) has the intuitively appealing implication that the direct reduction in investment
that results from the host country’s disregard of foreign investor interests in its regulatory decision,
does not indirectly induce the host country to reduce its regulation to the extent that there is in
equilibrium less regulation than there would be if the host country took full account of foreign
investors’ proﬁts. The latter outcome (kEi , θ
E
i ) would be given by k
E
i = K
i(θEi ) and θ
E
i = Θ
iG(kEi ):
Observation 3 Absent investment protection, the host country regulates more frequently (θNi <
θEi ), and ﬁrms invest less (k
N
i < k
E
i ), than when regulation is eﬃcient.
16
Full (unconstrained) eﬃciency requires that investment and regulation maximize joint welfare.
Denoting variables pertaining to such an outcome by superscript "G” (for "global"), the fully ef-
ﬁcient solution is deﬁned by kGi = K
iG(θGi ) and θ
G
i = Θ
iG(kGi ). We can decompose the total
investment distortion kGi − k
N
i absent any agreement into two parts. First, k
E
i − k
N
i > 0 is the
15The stability condition (7) implies that there exists at most one solution θ′. Existence follows by way of the
Mean-Value Theorem, Θi(Ki(θi))− θi ≥ 0 and Θ
i(Ki(θ¯i))− θ¯i ≤ 0.
16 If θEi ≤ θ
N
i , then θ
E
i ≤ Θ
i(kEi ) < Θ
iG(kEi ) = θ
E
i , where assumption (7) implies the weak inequality and
ΘiG(ki) > Θ
i(ki) the strict inequality. This is a contradiction, so θ
N
i < θ
E
i . Then, k
N
i < k
E
i follows from K
i
θ > 0.
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distortion of investment stemming from the host country’s disregard of foreign interests when reg-
ulating. The remaining part, kGi − k
E
i ≷ 0, reﬂects the ﬁrms’ neglect of production externalities.
The sign of the latter is ambiguous since the marginal production externality can be positive or
negative. Still, the model can generate overregulation and underinvestment also relative to the ﬁrst
best: θNi < θ
G
i and k
N
i < k
G
i . For expositional reasons we will think of this as the outcome absent
an agreement, but none of the results hinge on this.
4 Investment agreements
As was shown above, the irreversibility of investment and the host country disregard of the in-
terests of foreign investors can yield an outcome with overregulation and underinvestment. There
is therefore potentially scope for an investment agreement that stimulates foreign investment by
mitigating the host country incentive to regulate. A very simple agreement would request the host
country to fully compensate investors for foregone operating proﬁts whenever there is regulation.
But full compensation would cause investors to attach weight also to realizations of θi for which
their investments have no social value, and could thereby result in excessive investment. Simple as
this observation is, it points to a fundamental feature of regulatory expropriations that proponents
of investment agreements often seem to disregard: since regulations normally exist to address poten-
tial overinvestment problems, it is inherently possible for investment agreements to overshoot their
targets. Indeed, an agreement that compensates for all regulations might even reduce joint welfare
relative to the no-agreement situation.17 Consequently, an optimal investment agreement might
require exemptions from compensation. But how should such carve-outs optimally be designed,
and what are the implications of such agreements?
4.1 Do agreements cause regulatory chill?
A core claim in the policy debate holds that investment agreements cause regulatory chill, although
the notion is rarely precisely deﬁned.18 It can be given at least two diﬀerent interpretations within
the context of our model: We will say that an agreement causes domestic regulatory chill if the asso-
ciated compensation scheme prevents host countries from undertaking regulations they would chose
absent compensation. A corresponding global regulatory chill occurs if the agreement induces host
countries to allow production in situations where regulation would be desirable from a joint welfare
perspective. The following result, which we prove in Appendix A.2.3, has immediate implications
for the existence of regulatory chill:
Proposition 1 For any investment agreement satisfying Contract Restrictions (1)-(4) there exists
an alternative agreement satisfying the same restrictions that for each host country i:
17An example verifying this claim is available upon request. This particular moral hazard problem was pointed out
by Blume et al (1984).
18Janeba (2016) is an exception.
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(i) implements a threshold function for regulation Θi∗(ki) ∈ [Θ
i(ki),Θ
iG(ki)]; and
(ii) yields weakly higher expected domestic welfare and foreign industry proﬁts than under the initial
agreement.
It follows directly from the Proposition that there will be no global regulatory chill. On the contrary,
there will be regulation for a range of θi for which production would have been ex post eﬃcient, i.e.
θi ∈ (Θ
i∗(ki),Θ
iG(ki)). Hence:
Corollary 1 An optimal investment agreement implies domestic, but not global, regulatory chill.
The agreement will either induce ex post eﬃcient, or excessive regulation from a joint welfare per-
spective.
To see the generality of this ﬁnding, note ﬁrst that global regulatory chill can only occur if the
agreement stipulates compensation in excess of foregone operating proﬁts for some θi > Θ
iG(ki).
Firms earn Πj(ki) for such realizations of θi, since they are allowed to produce in case of regulatory
chill. Reducing compensation to Πj(ki) would instead induce the host country to regulate. The in-
vestment incentives would remain unchanged because ﬁrms would still receive their operating proﬁts
for those shocks, but now as compensation for regulation. The modiﬁcation of the compensation
scheme thus increases regulatory eﬃciency by eliminating global regulatory chill without inﬂuencing
investments or proﬁts, and therefore represents a Pareto improvement.
Proposition 1 has several other noteworthy implications. First, an optimal agreement never
induces regulation in instances where it would be eﬃcient for the host country to allow production
absent an agreement, i.e. for θi ≤ Θ
i(ki). For interventions to be ex post optimal for the host
country, ﬁrms would have to pay compensation when being regulated. This is ruled out by Con-
tract Restriction (4), but a non-negativity constraint could also reﬂect limited liability. Second,
optimal agreements feature domestic regulatory chill for a range of moderate regulatory shocks
θi ∈ (Θ
i(ki); Θ
i∗(ki)). But domestic regulatory chill then simply reﬂects the fact that an agreement
must dissuade the host country from regulating in certain circumstances for the agreement to be
meaningful.
A third fundamental property of regulation in optimal investment agreements that is identiﬁed
in Proposition 1 is the existence of a threshold value for regulation:
Corollary 2 For any arbitrary investment ki, it is ex post optimal for the host country to allow
production if and only if the shock is below a threshold Θi∗(ki).
It is of course always preferable from an ex post welfare point of view to regulate for very large
shocks because the net welfare beneﬁt of allowing production in host country i is strictly decreasing
in θi. But the agreement is designed prior to the realization of the shock, so every possible outcome
must be weighted by the density f i(θi) to obtain the expected net beneﬁt of allowing production.
Hence, the ex ante optimal compensation scheme could in principle yield non-monotonic regulation
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in θi, depending on the properties of the density function f
i(θi) of the shock. Still, it is possible
to hold the probability of regulation constant and to ensure production if and only if the shock is
suﬃciently mild, by awarding ﬁrms full compensation for all shocks below an appropriately chosen
threshold. As demonstrated in the proof of the Proposition, this "reshuﬄing" of the probability
of regulation increases regulatory eﬃciency and can be done without aﬀecting ﬁrms’ incentives to
invest or their expected proﬁts by a corresponding adjustment of the compensation payments.
The proof of Proposition 1 is constructive, showing how one can replace any initial compensation
scheme that satisﬁes Contract Restrictions (1)-(4), with another scheme that satisﬁes the same
restrictions, and that has the features listed in the Proposition. This alternative scheme uses
a convex combination of the ﬁrm’s foregone operating proﬁt and the payment under the initial
compensation scheme. The weights on the two components are country-speciﬁc and depend on θi,
but are the same for all ﬁrms that have invested in host country i. Hence, Proposition 1 is valid under
tighter restrictions on feasible agreements than those imposed by Contract Restrictions (1)-(4). For
instance, it holds for compensation schemes that pay out at most the foregone industry proﬁt as
compensation, and in particular for proportional compensation schemes (Contract Restriction (5)),
and in the presence of non-discrimination clauses.
Note that Proposition 1 applies to a more general framework than the one laid out in Section 3.
For instance, the setting employed in Appendix A.2.2 admits asymmetric ﬁrms, imperfect competi-
tion, and mixed foreign/domestic ownership structures, and the Proposition also holds when ﬁrms
invest strategically to inﬂuence regulatory decisions.
4.2 How should investors be compensated?
Related to the issue of whether investment agreements cause regulatory chill are questions regarding
when, and by how much, investors should be compensated in case host country policy measures
signiﬁcantly reduce their proﬁts. To characterize an optimal compensation function we invoke also
Contract Restriction (5), which stipulates that any compensation must be proportional to, and not
larger than, foregone operating proﬁts:19
Tˆ i(ki, θi) ≡ bi(θi)Π
j(ki), bi(θi) ∈ [0, 1]. (8)
The following Proposition characterizes optimal compensation schemes (the proof is provided in
Appendix A.4):
Proposition 2 For any investment agreement satisfying Contract Restrictions (1)-(5) there exists
an alternative agreement satisfying the same restrictions, and that for each host country i:
19An even more general proportional compensation mechanism would be Tˆ i(ki, θi) ≡ bi(ki, θi)Π
j(ki). However, this
formulation is equivalent to a non-linear compensation mechanism T˜ i(ki, θi), as can be seen by letting bi(ki, θi) ≡
T˜ i(ki, θi)/Π
j(ki). We consider non-linear compensation schemes in Section 5.5.
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(i) features the compensation function
T i(ki, θi) ≡
(
Πj(ki) if θi ≤ θˆi
0 if θi > θˆi;
(9)
(ii) yields weakly higher expected domestic welfare and foreign industry proﬁts than under the initial
agreement.
Hence, the optimal compensation can be characterized entirely in terms of a simple carve-out from
a full compensation requirement, whereby ﬁrms receive full compensation for foregone operating
proﬁts when regulation occurs for θi below a threshold value θˆi, and no compensation otherwise.
We will refer to this as the level of investment protection in country i.
Again, Proposition 2 is more general than our setting above would suggest. A carve-out scheme
is optimal also if we allow investors to take into account the eﬀects of their investments on the
probability of regulation; see Appendix A.3. A carve-out scheme is also optimal in the case of
a strategic monopolist, in which case we can relax Contract Restriction (5) by assuming that
compensation is non-negative but at most equal to foregone operating proﬁt Πj(ki); see Appendix
A.5. The main diﬀerence from the competitive setting is that the threshold for compensation then
depends on the level of investment.
Observe that while Contract Restriction (5) allows compensation to be strictly less than fore-
gone operating proﬁts, Proposition 2 nevertheless establishes the optimality of full compensation
whenever ﬁrms are eligible for compensation. It will be shown below that full compensation can be
suﬃcient to implement the fully eﬃcient outcome (θGi , k
G
i ). Consequently, full compensation not
only reﬂects a fundamental principle in Customary International Law, it also has desirable economic
properties, by eﬀectively inducing host countries to internalize all ramiﬁcations of their regulatory
decisions:
Observation 4 Compensation equal to foregone operating proﬁts aligns host country incentives
with the ex post eﬃcient level of regulation. Under certain conditions, such compensation can be
suﬃcient to correct both investment and regulation decisions.
4.3 Can agreements solve the overregulation/underinvestment problems?
There is an ongoing policy debate concerning the need to redesign investment protection agreements,
and is becoming increasingly common that model agreements are modiﬁed in order to reduce their
ambits; this is being done by the EU and India, for instance. These developments can be given
many explanations, but at a general level seem to reﬂect a dissatisfaction with the ability of the
agreements to increase investment at an acceptable cost in terms of associated constraints on do-
mestic policies. Such perceived shortcomings could in turn stem from a failure of the agreements to
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resolve overregulation/underinvestment problems in an eﬃcient manner, or from the distribution
of gains they produce. This Section will therefore investigate the extent to which agreement can
resolve these ineﬃciencies, and the next Section will examine their distributional implications.
We here consider agreements designed to maximize the joint welfare of the parties. This analysis
is of interest because it informs us about the maximal capacity of investment agreements to resolve
the problems they are meant to address. More speciﬁcally, to what extent do Contract Restrictions
(1)-(5) constrain the possible outcome away from the ﬁrst-best outcome (θGi , k
G
i )? But this con-
strained eﬃcient outcome could also be a reasonable prediction for the equilibrium agreement in
situations where the parties either are highly symmetric, or where they have access to some form
of side payments.
To evaluate the eﬃciency of any agreement, we need to ﬁrst derive formal expressions for the
welfare of the parties to an agreement based on a threshold θˆi for a host country i. The following
feature is established in Appendix A.3:
Lemma 1 The Nash equilibrium (θNi , k
N
i ) is the unique outcome of any agreement with a threshold
θˆi ≤ θ
N
i .
It would only be possible to implement regulation for θi < θ
N
i if the industry could be requested
to pay compensation in case of regulation, but this would violate Contract Restriction (4). Any
undertaking θˆi < θ
N
i thus is meaningless. And an undertaking θˆi = θ
N
i creates no strict gains
for either party, and thus will not be formed either. Hence, any meaningful agreement necessarily
features θˆi > θ
N
i .
The expected domestic welfare of host country i is
S˜i(θˆi) ≡

R θˆi
θi
Si(kˆi, θi)dF
i(θi) for θˆi ∈ [θ
N
i , θ
E
i )R ΘiG(kˆi)
θi
Si(kˆi, θi)dF
i(θi)− [F
i(θˆi)− F
i(ΘiG(kˆi))]Π
j(kˆi) for θˆi ∈ [θ
E
i , θ¯i],
(10)
where kˆi = K
i(θˆi) is the equilibrium investment. The ﬁrst row pertains to agreements with moderate
investment protection, θˆi ∈ [θ
N
i , θ
E
i ), and the second row to the case of strong investment protection,
θˆi ∈ [θ
E
i , θ¯i]. Hence, compensation function (9) eﬀectively induces the host country to internalize
the joint welfare eﬀects of regulation for shocks below θˆi, because the country then has to pay full
compensation to foreign investors, but not for shocks above θˆi. Furthermore, it is jointly welfare
optimal to allow production for all θi ≤ Θ
iG(kˆi), whereas regulation maximizes domestic welfare
if θi > Θ
i(kˆi). Note in particular the occurrence of overregulation for θi ∈ (θˆi,Θ
iG(kˆi)) under
moderate investment protection, whereas all regulation is ex post eﬃcient under a strong level of
investment protection.20
20Stability condition (7) implies θˆi ∈ [Θ
i(kˆi),Θ
iG(kˆi)) for all θˆi ∈ [θ
N
i , θ
E
i ), but θˆi ≥ Θ
iG(kˆi) for all θˆi ∈ [θ
E
i , θ¯i].
Under moderate investment protection, the host country allows production for all θi ≤ θˆi < Θ
iG(kˆi), and regulates for
all θi > θˆi ≥ Θ
i(kˆi). Under strong investment protection, the host country allows production for all θi ≤ Θ
iG(kˆi) ≤ θˆi,
but regulates with compensation for θi ∈ (θˆi,Θ
iG(kˆi)]. Regulation maximizes domestic welfare also for all θi > θˆi >
ΘiG(kˆi), but then the host country does not have to pay any compensation.
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The expected welfare of source country j from its investments in country i equals the expected
proﬁts
Π˜j(θˆi) ≡ F
i(θˆi)Π
j(kˆi)−R
j(kˆi). (11)
For θi ≤ θˆi it is immaterial to foreign investors whether they are allowed to produce and earn their
operating proﬁts, or whether the industry is regulated and the investors make the same proﬁts in
the form of compensation payments. For θi > θˆi ≥ Θ
i(kˆi) the industry is always regulated, but
the host country does not have to pay any compensation. We assume throughout that the industry
proﬁt is increasing in the level of investment protection:
Π˜jθ(θˆi) = Π
j(kˆi)f
i(θˆi) +X
i(kˆi)P
i
k(kˆi)K
i
θ(θˆi)F
i(θˆi) > 0. (12)
Intuitively, this assumption requires that the direct eﬀect of improved investment protection domi-
nates the indirect price eﬀect of increased investments at the aggregate industry level.
Let the joint expected welfare be denoted W˜ i(θˆi) ≡ S˜
i(θˆi) + Π˜
j(θˆi); we assume for simplicity
that W˜ i(θˆi) is strictly quasi-concave for θˆi > θ
E
i . Also, let θ
W
i ≡ argmaxθˆi≥θNi
W˜ i(θˆi), with the
corresponding investment level denoted kWi ≡ K
i(θWi ).
There are three qualitatively diﬀerent types of outcomes, depending on the eﬀect of increased
investment on the production externality. A ﬁrst case occurs when the marginal production exter-
nality evaluated at θˆi = θ
E
i is negative:
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W˜ iθ(θ
E
i ) =
R θEi
θi
Ψik(k
E
i , θi)dF
i(θi)K
i
θ(θ
E
i ) < 0. (13)
An increase in investment protection above θEi would then only serve to exacerbate an overinvest-
ment problem without improving the ex post incentive to regulate. The constrained eﬃcient level
of protection is the solution to W˜ iθ(θ
W
i ) = 0, and has the feature that θ
W
i < θ
E
i , with k
W
i < k
E
i . It
strikes a balance
Πj(kWi )f
i(θWi ) = −
R θWi
θi
Ψik(k
W
i , θi)dF
i(θi)K
i
θ(θ
W
i )− S
i(kWi , θ
W
i )f
i(θWi )
between the direct marginal beneﬁt to foreign investors from investment protection (the term on
the left-hand side of the above equation) against the worsened expected production externality (the
ﬁrst term on the right-hand side) plus the cost of additional domestic underregulation (the second
term on the right-hand side).
In a situation with underinvestment absent an agreement, kNi ≤ k
G
i , it would be possible to
implement the eﬃcient investment level kGi by an appropriate choice of investment protection θ
′
i ∈
[θNi , θ
E
i ], but there would still be overregulation, θ
′
i < θ
G
i .
22 Hence, it is impossible to obtain the fully
21Recall that the threshold θEi = Θ
iG(Ki(θEi )) represents the equilibrium absent an agreement if the host country
were to fully internalize all eﬀects on foreign proﬁt in its regulatory decision, but ﬁrms invest to maximize expected
proﬁt.
22The assumption of W˜ iθ(θ
E
i ) < 0 and strict quasi-concavity imply k
G
i < k
E
i . By the additional assumption k
N
i ≤ k
G
i ,
we obtain a string of inequalities Ki(θNi ) = k
N
i ≤ k
G
i < k
E
i = K
i(θEi ). The mean-value theorem and monotonicity of
Ki therefore imply the existence of a unique θ′i ∈ [θ
N
i , θ
E
i ) such that K
i(θ′i) = k
G
i . However, by the stability condition
(7), it follows that θ′i < Θ
iG(Ki(θ′i)) = Θ
iG(kGi ) = θ
G
i .
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eﬃcient outcome (θGi , k
G
i ) with the carve-out scheme (9) when the marginal expected production
externality as deﬁned in (13) is negative.
The second case is where the marginal production externality is non-negative at θEi , W˜
i
θ(θ
E
i ) ≥ 0,
but not larger than
W˜ iθ(θ¯i) = [
R ΘiG(k¯i)
θi
Ψik(k¯i, θi)dF
i(θ)− (1− F (ΘiG(k¯i))Rk(k¯i)]K
i
θ(θ¯i) ≤ 0, (14)
where k¯i = K
i(θ¯i) is the investment level that results if foreign investors are fully compensated for
all regulation. In this case, the carve-out scheme (9) is suﬃcient to implement the fully eﬃcient
outcome (θGi , k
G
i ). Increasing the level of investment protection θˆi up to the level θ
E
i improves
ﬁrms’ ex ante incentives to invest, and simultaneously removes the host country’s incentive to
overregulate. Regulation is ex post eﬃcient for strong protection levels θˆi ≥ θ
E
i , and θˆi can then be
used exclusively to improve the industry’s investment incentives.
In the third case, the marginal expected production externality is too large for it to be possible to
implement the fully eﬃcient investment level even under complete investment protection: W˜ iθ(θ¯i) >
0, and kGi > k¯i. In this situation, the welfare maximizing choice oﬀers full protection of operating
proﬁts, θWi = θ¯i, but there will still be underinvestment.
We summarize the above ﬁndings regarding an agreement that maximizes joint welfare as follows
(see Appendix A.5 for a formal proof ):
Proposition 3 A constrained eﬃcient investment agreement satisfying Contract Restrictions (1)-
(5) achieves the fully eﬃcient outcome (θGi , k
G
i ) when the marginal expected production externality is
positive, but not too large. In other situations the agreement can only achieve second-best outcomes.
To conclude, it is hardly surprising that Contract Restrictions (1)-(5) hinder the agreement from
implementing the ﬁrst best in some situations. More surprising is the fact that it is still possible to
correct both the regulatory and the investment distortion by means of the single policy variable θˆi
in a robust set of circumstances.23 ,24
4.4 Who beneﬁts and who loses?
We now turn to distributional aspects of optimal investment agreements. The equilibrium level of
investment protection is determined through negotiations between the parties to an agreement. One
23 In comparison, Blume et al (1984), Miceli and Segerson (1994) and Aisbett et al (2010a) establish eﬃciency in
the knife-edge case when the marginal production externality is zero (Ψk = 0, ∀θ) so that only the host country’s
incentive to regulate is distorted.
24We conjecture that a carve-out policy is suﬃcient to maximize joint welfare also for the negative marginal produc-
tion externality (13) if compensation Tˆi(ki, θi) ≥ 0 is required to be non-decreasing in ki. It should then be optimal
to set Tˆ ik(ki, θi) = 0 to reduce ﬁrms’ overinvestment. The remaining problem would be to maximize joint welfare over
θˆi. Non-negative marginal compensation, Tˆ
i(ki, θi) ≥ 0, would arise under a restriction that all compensation be
equal to the fair market value of the investment and if this value is non-decreasing in the amount of capital invested.
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would therefore expect the equilibrium investment protection to diﬀer from the constrained eﬃcient
level θWi , but an agreement can generally speaking result in either over- and underinvestment.
25
Source country j would prefer full protection for its investment in country i, θˆi = θ¯i, whereas
country i would prefer the level of investment protection that maximizes its expected domestic
welfare, θUi ≡ argmaxθˆi≥θNi
S˜i(θˆi). Consequently, the countries have a common interest in setting
θˆi no lower than θ
U
i . The assumption that the parties split the surplus from the agreement thus
implies the following:26
Observation 5 The negotiated level of investment protection, and the level of investment, will in
any agreement exceed the level that maximizes host country domestic welfare: θˆi ≥ θ
U
i , with strict
inequality unless the host country prefers maximal investment protection (θUi = θ¯i).
The negotiated level of protection will also depend on whether the agreement covers one-way or
two-ways ﬂows of investment. When investments ﬂow in both directions, it is possible to negotiate
exchanges of concessions across industries. In the special case of agreements between fairly sym-
metric countries, such as the TTIP negotiations between the EU and the US, it would be natural to
assume that the negotiated level of investment protection θˆi de facto maximizes the joint expected
welfare.
To obtain sharper predictions concerning the distributional eﬀects of agreements, we will con-
trast two stylized types of agreements. The ﬁrst scenario is the agreement between a developed
and a developing country. While often formally symmetric, such agreements are in practice highly
asymmetric since they are meant to encourage increased investment ﬂows from developed to the
developing countries only. We denote this a "North-South" agreement. The other scenario is an
agreement between two developed countries. Such agreements typically diﬀer from North-South
agreements in two respects. First, there are investment ﬂows in both directions between the con-
tracting parties. Second, countries are able to make credible unilateral commitments with regard
to investment protection absent any agreement. To simplify matters we will focus on situations
where the countries are mirror images in terms of demand structures, technologies, and propensity
to experience regulatory shocks; this also seems broadly descriptive of the conditions that faced e.g.
the EU-US negotiations over TTIP. We will refer to this as a "North-North" agreement. We use
25A constrained eﬃcient agreement could of course be achieved by pure coincidence, for instance under a speciﬁc
distribution of the bargaining strength. Assume that the negotiated investment protection level θˆi maximizes the
Nash product [S˜i(θˆi) − S˜
i(θNi )]
ρi [Π˜j(θˆi) − Π˜
j(θNi )]
ρj , where ρi (ρj) is the bargaining strength of the host (source)
country. Using S˜iθ(θ
W
i ) + Π˜
j
θ(θ
W
i ) = 0, it is straightforward to verify that the negotiated solution equals θ
W
i if
ρi
ρj
=
S˜i(θWi )− S˜
i(θNi )
Π˜j(θWi )− Π˜j(θ
N
i )
.
26A marginal increase in θˆi at θ
U
i has a ﬁrst-order eﬀect on industry proﬁt, Π˜
j
θ(θ
U
i ) > 0, but only a second-order
eﬀect on domestic expected welfare, S˜iθ(θ
U
i ) = 0, if θ
U
i ∈ (θ
N
i , θ¯i). Setting θˆi > θ
U
i increases thus total surplus. If
θUi = θ
N
i , Lemma 1 implies that an investment agreement is economically meaningful only if θˆi > θ
N
i = θ
U
i .
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throughout the situation absent an agreement as a benchmark for evaluating the consequences of
the agreements.
The expected beneﬁt to North (country j) of a North-South agreement is Π˜j(θˆi) − Π˜
j(θNi ).
Since the expected industry proﬁt increases with higher levels of investment protection, North
would beneﬁt from any agreement with θˆi > θ
N
i . A necessary and suﬃcient condition for there to
be scope for a North-South agreement is therefore that South unilaterally prefers a protection level
θUi > θ
N
i . If markets are perfectly competitive, there are no ﬁrst order eﬀects from an agreement
in terms of induced changes in production or investment levels. Instead, South beneﬁts from an
agreement if the combined eﬀect of the fall in the price of the good and the expected change in the
production externality is positive:
S˜iθ(θ
N
i ) = −P
i
k(k
N
i )X
i(kNi )F
i(θNi ) +
R θNi
θi
Ψik(k
N
i , θi)K
i
θ(θ
N
i )dF
i(θi) > 0. (15)
In fact, South could beneﬁt from an agreement even if the expected production externalities were
negative, provided the beneﬁts of the price reductions were suﬃciently large. South’s motive for
entering into an agreement with North would then be pure rent-shifting. But the agreement would
still beneﬁt North since it would increase the range of θi for which there is no regulation; recall our
assumption that the direct beneﬁt of investment protection dominates the negative price eﬀect in
(12). However, it is entirely possible that the expected production externality is suﬃciently negative
to outweigh any positive price eﬀects, so that θUi = θ
N
i , even if an agreement would increase joint
welfare:
W˜ iθ(θ
N
i ) =
R θNi
θi
Ψik(k
N
i , θi)dF
i(θi)K
i
θ(θ
N
i ) + Π
j(kNi )f
i(θNi ) > 0. (16)
There are thus two ﬁrst-order divergences between host country interests and the aggregate eﬀects
in a North-South setting. First, the reduction in the consumer price that follows from increased
investment protection –the ﬁrst term in (15)–is only a transfer from ﬁrms to consumers from a
global perspective. Second, the host country does not take into consideration the expected increase
in operating proﬁts of foreign investors from less frequent regulation–the second term in (16). An
investment agreement might thus fail to form despite being desirable from a global perspective.27
In the case of a North-North agreement the expected welfare of country i equals S˜i(θWi )+Π˜
i(θWj ),
where θWi = θ
W
j by the assumed symmetry. As countries can unilaterally commit with regard to
compensation, country i will not accept any agreement that yields less than S˜i(θUi ) + Π˜
i(θUj ),
where θUi = θ
U
j due to the assumed symmetry. Also, Π˜
i(θWj ) = Π˜
j(θWi ) and Π˜
i(θUj ) = Π˜
j(θUi )
by the symmetry, so any agreement satisﬁes W˜ i(θWi ) > W˜
i(θUi ) for both countries. Hence, a
North-North agreement will arise if and only if it increases joint welfare. A suﬃcient condition for
this is W˜ iθ(θ
N ) > 0 even if θU = θN .28 But the gains from a North-North agreement come with
27This case might arise even if there is underinvestment relative to ﬁrst best investments, kNi < k
G
i , since the
implementation of kGi presumes that it is possible to directly control investment.
28One could argue that Northern countries should not be constrained to compensation schemes fulﬁlling Contract
Restrictions (1)-(5) when making unilateral commitments to investment protection. If so, this would reduce the scope
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pronounced distributional implications. Since country i can unilaterally implement its preferred
protection level for inﬂowing FDI, it will suﬀer the loss S˜i(θUi )− S˜
i(θWi ) > 0 in domestic welfare by
signing an agreement with j. Country i will therefore accept such an agreement if and only if it is
compensated for this domestic loss in terms of better investment protection abroad for the FDI of its
domestically-owned industry: θWj > θ
U
j is suﬃciently large that Π˜
i(θWj )−Π˜
i(θUj ) > S˜
i(θUi )−S˜
i(θWi ).
The above arguments and Observation 5 jointly imply:
Proposition 4 A North-South agreement might not form even if it increases expected joint welfare.
But if it does, the agreement beneﬁts foreign investors and increases domestic welfare in South. A
North-North agreement is formed if and only if it increases expected joint welfare. Such an agreement
beneﬁts foreign investors in both countries, but reduces expected domestic welfare in both countries.
We believe that these observations shed light on the political economy of investment agreements.
The costs and beneﬁts for the Southern parties to North-South investment agreements have been
discussed for years. But generally speaking, several thousands of such agreements have been signed
without much political upheaval. This contrasts sharply with the heated debate concerning the
attempts to include investment protection in more symmetric agreements, and most notably in
CETA, TPP, and TTIP. Our North-South and North-North scenarios point to a possible expla-
nation for the much more critical public view of the mega-regional agreements: the existing legal
systems in e.g. the EU and the U.S. already provide suﬃcient protection of FDI to internalize all
domestic welfare eﬀects. The additional investment protection that an agreement such as TTIP
would oﬀer would mainly beneﬁt foreign investors, but would harm the rest of society, for instance
by exacerbating domestic regulatory chill. Incidentally, these distributional eﬀects appear closely
compatible with arguments that have been put forward by the U.S. Administration and the EU
Commission as to the beneﬁts of investment protection in TTIP. Both sides have emphasized the
beneﬁts from increased protection of their respective outgoing investment ﬂows, but have rarely
pointed to beneﬁts from increased domestic investment protection.
4.5 Two diﬀerent roles of investment agreements
The stylized North-South and North-North scenarios identify two diﬀerent roles that investment
agreement might play. The welfare beneﬁts from a North-South investment agreement stem entirely
from the credibility the agreement lends to South’s commitment to compensate for regulation for a
range of θi > θ
N
i . If South had full unilateral commitment possibilities, it would choose θ
U
i absent
any agreement, in which case there would be no gains from an agreement: S˜i(θˆi)− S˜
i(θUi ) ≤ 0 for
all θˆi. But lacking this commitment ability, South has to negotiate with North over the level of
investment protection, and will consequently have to accept a higher level of investment protection
for an investment agreement. But since host countries do not internalize the eﬀects of their protection on foreign
investors, there could still be room for a welfare improving agreement of the type we are considering.
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than what is optimal from the point of view of domestic welfare. While an investment agreement can
help South attract foreign investment from North, it is an imperfect substitute for credible domestic
institutions from South’s perspective. The role of North-South agreements thus corresponds closely
to the notion that trade agreements serve as commitment devices, helping governments to withstand
domestic protectionist pressures.29
The beneﬁts of a North-North agreement do not arise from this type of commitment, as countries
are able to unilaterally commit to protecting incoming investment, but from internalization of
negative international externalities from national regulatory policies. Since investments ﬂow in both
directions, the parties can negotiate improved investment protection abroad by oﬀering improved
investment protection for foreign investment at home. This corresponds closely to the standard
view of the gains from trade agreements, which sees these agreements as means for taking countries
out of Prisoners’ Dilemmas by allowing them to exchange increased imports for increased exports
to mutual beneﬁt.
Observation 6 The rationale for a North-South agreement is South’s lack of unilateral commit-
ment possibilities regarding investment protection. A North-North agreement solves a Prisoners’
Dilemma-like problem between the countries.
Yet another diﬀerence between North-North and North-South agreements is the extent to which
they can substitute for commercial contracts between host countries and individual investors. In
commercial contracts the parties can contract the level of investment, and possibly also regulatory
policies. Such contracts would be superior to state-to-state agreements for Southern countries, (dis-
regarding transaction costs). Commercial contracts cannot always replace North-North agreements
however, since the negotiations over commercial contracts typically do not allow for exchanges of
concessions.
Observation 7 Contracting on investment and regulation with individual investors directly would
be better than a North-South agreement (absent transaction costs), but would not necessarily domi-
nate a North-North agreement.
4.6 Compensation for political vs. regulatory shocks
A fundamental principle in international law is that legitimate governments can make long-term
commitments on behalf of their states. But it is often held that investment agreements impose
undemocratic constraints on future governments. Other observers argue instead that investors
should be protected against changes in political preferences, and that they should be compensated
in case of regulation regardless of whether motivated by exogenous factors or changes in the political
29Bown and Horn (2015) informally discuss a similar distinction between traditional developing/developed country
investment agreements, and investment agreements between developed countries. They suggest that the latter might
not serve to address hold-up problems, but other forms of externality problems.
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situation. To shed some light on this issue, we will distinguish between shocks that inﬂuence
regulatory decisions for given political preferences, and changes in political preferences that aﬀect
regulatory decisions for given regulatory environments. An actual example of this is the acceleration
of the German nuclear phase-out that was decided in the aftermath of the Fukushima disaster. This
decision can either be viewed as motivated by the arrival of new information concerning the dangers
of nuclear power, or as a political move by government facing dwindling popular support.30 Both
types of shocks have triggered litigation under investment agreements. Should they be treated
diﬀerently?
To capture the distinction between exogenous and political risks, we make a very simple refor-
mulation of the model by assuming that there are two shocks in country i, an exogenous regulatory
shock ηi, and a political preference shock λi. The shocks are multiplicative such that the externality
perceived by a government with the preference parameter λi is Ψ
i(ki, θi), where θi ≡ ηiλi. By this
characterization, a higher λi implies a government that is more sensitive to exogenous information
concerning the value of allowing production and therefore is more prone to regulate. Assume that
both shocks are resolved simultaneously between the investment stage and the production stage,
and let F i(θi) be the cumulative distribution of the total shock in host country i. This reformulated
version of the model is formally identical to the one above, except with regard to the interpretation
of θi.
Assume that the agreement is negotiated behind a veil of ignorance and designed to maximize
expected joint welfare, where the expectation is taken over both the regulatory and the political
shock. In this case, Proposition 1 still characterizes an optimal investment agreement as a function
of θˆi, and θ
W
i is the (constrained) jointly welfare maximizing level of investment protection. By
assumption, the two shocks aﬀect the outcome in a completely symmetric fashion and therefore
are perfect substitutes. The corresponding welfare maximizing level of investment protection for
exogenous regulatory shocks ηi thus equals η
W
i = θ
W
i /λi for any political preference λi. Hence:
Observation 8 The compensation to ﬁrms should depend on political preferences in a welfare op-
timal investment agreement. With the total shock given by θi ≡ ηiλi, a government that is more
sensitive to exogenous shocks (λi is higher) should be allowed to oﬀer less investment protection for
such shocks (ηWi is smaller).
We have here used a highly reduced form of political preference representation. However, the
multiplicative speciﬁcation was only chosen for expositional simpliﬁcation. More critical is the
assumption that the compensation scheme is designed behind the veil of ignorance. The properties
of the agreement are likely to reﬂect the political preferences of the government in place when
the agreement is negotiated. The current government can then bind the regulatory decisions of
future governments independently of future political preferences by establishing that regulation
30Another example of political changes triggering expropriation, is the wave of nationalization and regulation that
occurred in Venezuela after Mr. Hugo Chavez came to power, and that led to a number of litigations.
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should depend entirely on ηi instead of θi. Hence, political preference shocks could be left out of
investment agreements for political economy reasons, even if it would have been eﬃcient to include
them.
5 Extensions
This section extends the above analysis in a number of directions. We ﬁrst consider non-discrimination
and direct expropriation clauses. Then we turn to the robustness of the optimal compensation rules,
to assumptions concerning market structure, and to asymmetric information. Finally, we derive a
new compensation scheme based on relative performance that can implement the global optimum
under a range of circumstances. For simplicity, we assume that countries are completely symmetric,
and we suppress country indices throughout.
5.1 A National Treatment clause
Investment agreements typically include non-discrimination clauses. We have so far steered away
from discrimination issues simply by assuming that there are no domestic ﬁrms. This is not quite as
restrictive as it might seem, since there are in practice many instances where a National Treatment
(NT) clause will not have any bite due to a lack of domestic ﬁrms that operate under suﬃciently
"like circumstances" to those facing foreign investors. To shed some light on the role of NT in
our setting, we now assume that host countries feature a domestically-owned industry (indicated
by subscript D), in addition to the foreign-owned industry (indicated by subscript F ). The two
industries are identical in terms of demand and production structures, suﬀer from the same country-
speciﬁc shock, and therefore produce under "like circumstances" for the purpose of an NT provision.
But the sectors are economically unrelated to avoid that strategic considerations inﬂuence regulation
decisions. Each host country fully internalizes the consequences of regulation for the proﬁts of its
domestic industry, but continues to disregard the impact on foreign proﬁts.
To identify the nature of discrimination, note ﬁrst that the host country regulates the foreign
industry more frequently than the domestic industry if there is no investment protection: θNF = θ
N
and θND = θ
E > θN , with the corresponding investment levels kNF = k
N and kND = k
E > kN ; see
Observation 3. The host country chooses diﬀerent levels of protection in the two sectors also if it
is able to unilaterally commit to investment protection: θUF = θ
U and θUD = θ
W ≥ θU , followed by
equilibrium investments kUF = K(θ
U ) and kUD = K(θ
W ) ≥ kU ; these inequalities are strict in the
standard case of incomplete investment protection (θU < θ¯).
Foreign ﬁrms can be said to face two forms of discrimination in these circumstances. First, the
host country regulates foreign investment more frequently, θNF < θ
N
D and θ
U
F ≤ θ
U
D, despite both
industries being subject to the same shock θ. Second, the host country applies a stricter rule for
when to regulate industry F for any investment level k, since Θ(k) < ΘG(k). This will not have
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any separate implications however, as long as ﬁrms treat regulatory decisions as unaﬀected by their
respective investment choices. So what impact would a commitment to NT have?
We represent an NT clause by the requirement that θF ≥ θD, where the weak inequality reﬂects
the fact that NT clauses do not rule out a comparatively more favorable treatment of foreign
investment. This restriction ensures that the domestic industry is regulated whenever there is
regulation of the foreign industry, but not vice versa. To limit the number of cases to consider, we
focus on the North-North and North-South settings.
5.1.1 An agreement comprising NT only
A common view among critics of investment agreements is that their sole role should be to pre-
vent discriminatory treatment of foreign investment. For instance, Stiglitz (2008, p. 249) argues
that "...non-discrimination provisions will provide much of the security that investors need without
compromising the ability of democratic governments to conduct their business." Imposing an NT
provision in a no-agreement situation would force investment protection to a common level θF = θD
because there would be more frequent regulation of foreign investments absent an agreement, re-
gardless of whether the host country can commit unilaterally or not. Since foreign and domestic
ﬁrms are fully symmetric, they will make the same investment under an NT clause.
In a North-South agreement on NT only, the unilaterally determined common investment pro-
tection level θNSNTOnly would be given by
2S(K(θNSNTOnly), θ
NS
NTOnly) + Π(K(θ
NS
NTOnly)) ≡ 0
where the ﬁrst term is the domestic welfare derived from the two industries, and the second term
the proﬁts of the domestic industry. It is easy to verify that θNSNTOnly ∈ (θ
N
F , θ
N
D) under a similar
stability condition as (7). Consequently, there will be increased foreign investment, and reduced
domestic investment. This beneﬁts North, but has ambiguous implications for domestic welfare in
South.
In a North-North agreement on NT only, the unilaterally determined common protection level
θNNNTOnly has the following features (see Appendix A.4 for a proof):
Lemma 2 θU ≤ θNNNTOnly ≤ θ
W , with strict inequalities if θNNNTOnly ∈ (θ
N , θ¯).
Consequently, this agreement increases (reduces) the level of investment protection for foreign (do-
mestic) investors beyond (below) the unilaterally optimal level and therefore reduces host country
domestic welfare. By way of the two-way investment ﬂows, both countries beneﬁt from the better
treatment of their foreign investment, and it is ambiguous whether they would accept such an agree-
ment. Indeed, in the present setting it might actually be better from a joint welfare perspective to
have no agreement at all compared to an agreement that only imposes NT.
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Proposition 5 The imposition of only an NT provision:
(i) has ambiguous welfare consequences in a North-North agreement;
(ii) beneﬁts North, and has ambiguous welfare consequences for South, in a North-South agreement.
More could be achieved if the parties also negotiated investment protection levels for the for-
eign industries. In particular, a more extensive agreement would facilitate an internalization of
international externalities from domestic regulation in case of two-way investment ﬂows.
5.1.2 NT as a complement to undertakings on investment protection levels
Investment agreements usually include both NT and investment protection obligations. How does
the presence of NT aﬀect the optimal design of the latter provisions? A North-North agreement will
yield the same eﬃcient protection level in the respective F sectors. By symmetry across industries,
this is exactly the same level of investment protection as in the respective domestic industry absent
an NT clause: θD = θF = θ
W . Consequently, there is no role for NT here.
The picture is more complex in the North-South case. An NT clause is again redundant if the
agreement without NT already implies an investment protection level θNS for the foreign industry
that exceeds the level θE for the domestic industry. Hence, NT has an impact only if South has
suﬃcient bargaining power absent NT to achieve θNS < θE . Let θNSNT be the negotiated level of
investment protection in a Pareto optimal North-South agreement under NT. We prove in Appendix
A.4 that an NT clause in a North-South agreement increases the level of investment protection above
the level of a North-North agreement comprising only NT:
Lemma 3 θNSNT ≥ θ
NN
NTOnly, with strict inequality if θ
NN
NTOnly ∈ (θ
N , θ¯).
If South has most of the bargaining power, the negotiated outcome will be close to θU absent NT.
In particular, θU < θNS ≤ θNNNTOnly < θ
NS
NT if also θ
NN
NTOnly ∈ (θ
N , θ¯). North is then strictly better
oﬀ with an NT provision included in the agreement, since this will increase the level of investment
protection (θNSNT > θ
NS). The eﬀect on South is ambiguous. The domestic welfare in sector D
(including the proﬁts of the domestic industry) can potentially increase if the equilibrium level of
investment protection moves closer to the unilaterally optimal level θW than before. However, its
welfare from the industry with incoming foreign investment is likely to fall, because the NT clause
here increases the level of investment protection even further away from the domestically optimal
level θU .
Proposition 6 The imposition of an NT provision as a complement to undertakings on investment
protection:
(i) serves no purpose in a North-North agreement; and
(ii) either serves no purpose, or beneﬁts North and has ambiguous welfare consequences for South,
in a North-South agreement.
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NT is normally perceived as an instrument that prevents parties to an agreement from exploiting
contractual incompleteness and thereby undermine bargaining concessions. In the case of trade
agreements, a myriad of domestic policies can be used to oﬀset commitments concerning border
instruments; for instance, a tariﬀ binding could easily be rendered useless by the introduction of
a "sales tax" solely levied on the imported product. NT renders such opportunistic behavior less
attractive by eﬀectively forcing the importing country to distort also its domestic production if it
wants to distort trade.31 The purpose of NT in the present context is diﬀerent as it is not meant
to neutralize opportunistic behavior–there is no commitment that is eroded due to the complete
economic separation between the two sectors. Instead, NT here essentially serves to extend the
commitment possibilities that the investment agreement brings to the domestic sector:
Observation 9 NT allows countries that lack credible unilateral commitment possibilities to indi-
rectly use the enforcement mechanism oﬀered by investment agreements to solve ex post underregu-
lation problems in their domestic sectors.32
Noted ﬁnally that NT could play a more substantial role if there were other policy instruments host
countries could use to undermine undertakings concerning investment protection levels. We leave
this issue for future research.
5.2 A direct expropriation clause
A primary objective of investment agreements is of course to prevent direct expropriation. Such
instances are nowadays less common than during the 1960s and 1970s, but are not completely
something of the past, as shown by Hajzler (2012). Investment agreements typically have stricter
rules regarding compensation for direct than for indirect expropriation, in the sense that carve-outs
from the expropriation clauses, which we described in Section 2, only apply to direct expropriation.
This stricter attitude might seem intuitively appealing since direct expropriations are (at best)
pure transfers of rents. Matters are not quite as simple from a contractual point of view, however.
First, regulatory expropriations shut down production in the regulated entities, whereas production
31Horn (2006) examines the pros and cons of NT in trade agreements from this perspective.
32 In the case of two-way investment ﬂows and non-commitment such as in a South-South scenario, an eﬃcient
negotiation over investment protection for foreign investment absent NT would lead to the protection level θW in
the F sectors in the two countries. Assuming that countries cannot unilaterally commit to investment protection for
its domestic industry, they will apply a diﬀerent threshold θND = θ
E 6= θW for regulation in the domestically-owned
industry D. Adding NT will still be inconsequential if the marginal production externality as deﬁned in Proposition
3 is non-negative, because then the foreign sector would enjoy (weakly) more protection than the domestic sector
under the initial agreement: θW ≥ θE . However, in the opposite case of a negative marginal expected production
externality, the NT clause would enable countries to credibly reduce underregulation in their domestic sectors from
θE to θW . This reduction in the level of investment protection represents a domestic welfare improvement that hurts
the domestic industry less than it beneﬁts the rest of the domestic economy: the protection level θW maximizes W˜ (θˆ),
and θE > θW implies Π˜(θE) > Π˜(θW ). Hence, S˜(θW )− S˜(θE) = W˜ (θW )− W˜ (θE) + Π˜(θE)− Π˜(θW ) > 0.
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can continue in the case of a direct expropriation, albeit perhaps less eﬃciently operated by the
government. Second, host countries beneﬁt from regulatory expropriations by avoiding regulatory
problems, but in the process suﬀer other welfare losses. With direct expropriation the beneﬁts
instead come from gaining access to a stream of operating proﬁts. Surprisingly perhaps, these
diﬀerences imply that it can actually be eﬃciency-enhancing to allow for direct expropriations.
Consider an initial investment agreement that yields equilibrium investment kˆ. Assume that
there is ineﬃcient overregulation for θ ∈ (θˆ,ΘG(kˆ)). Consider a modiﬁed version with the same
compensation rule for intervention as before, but that now allows the country to directly expropriate
for shocks in the domain (θˆ,ΘG(kˆ)]. The additional beneﬁt from the expropriated proﬁts now will
cause the host country to take over the ﬁrm, and then to allow production for all shock realizations
θ ∈ (θˆ,ΘG(kˆ)] for which it previously shut down regulation. From the viewpoint of investors, it
does not matter whether they are regulated or expropriated. They receive the same return and
therefore continue to invest kˆ. An agreement with regulation and expropriation is therefore more
eﬃcient than one without any possibilities for direct expropriation, since production is ex post
globally optimal for all θ < ΘG(kˆ). Intuitively, direct expropriation can represent a more eﬃcient
means of preventing overinvestment than regulatory expropriation, by not causing a shut-down of
ex post valuable production. These beneﬁcial features of direct expropriation can actually take us
very far (the proof is found in Appendix A.6):
Proposition 7 The fully eﬃcient solution (kG, θG) can be implemented as a Nash equilibrium
through an international investment agreement that allows direct expropriation if expropriation does
not reduce the proﬁts from the expropriated assets.
The point is not to argue that direct expropriations should be allowed in actual agreements, but
rather that the reason for not doing so is not as trivial as it might seem. The common negative
perception of direct expropriations is probably often based on the notion that they eﬀectively
constitute unproductive (or worse) thefts that deter investment. But it is exactly the fact that these
measures constitute a pure transfer of ownership that might provide a role for them in investment
agreements. Their role is then to mitigate overinvestment stemming from the full compensation
that is used to reduce the ex post incentives to regulate.
An important caveat for eﬃciency enhancing direct expropriation is that the shock θ has to be
observable and veriﬁable for a globally eﬃcient outcome to be achievable. Assume instead that the
host country has private information about θ. The value of allowing production in the foreign-owned
industry is S(k,θ), whereas the value of direct expropriation is S(k,θ) + Π(k) − T x, where T x is
what the host country must pay in compensation to foreign investors under direct expropriation.
The net beneﬁt Π(k) − T x of direct expropriation is independent of the realization of θ. The host
country would never truthfully reveal θ if the expropriation compensation were to depend on the
shock. Hence, the only way an investment agreement can ensure foreign ownership is proﬁtable is to
set T x ≥ Π(k). With this compensation scheme, the host country either allows private production
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or regulates, but direct expropriation can never be strictly beneﬁcial to the host country. If the
above inequality were reversed, the host country would always intervene in the market, either by
direct expropriation or through regulation. But it would never be optimal for the host country to
maintain private ownership of the foreign industry.
We conclude that it impossible to have direct expropriation for some realizations of the shock
and regulation for other realizations in our setting if the host country is privately informed about
the shock. Instead, the host country has to choose either private or state ownership. If private
ownership is preferred, the simplest way to achieve this is by awarding ﬁrms full compensation for
all foregone operating proﬁts under direct expropriation: T x = Π(k).
5.3 Monopoly
FDI is often undertaken by ﬁrms with signiﬁcant market power in their output markets. Investment
decisions might in such instances be inﬂuenced by how they aﬀect the probability of regulation.
Indeed, the early FDI literature discusses how investors could reduce host country governments’
incentives to expropriate, for instance by choosing more complex production techniques than nec-
essary, or by maintaining vital parts of the production process outside the host country. As pointed
out above, Appendix A.2 demonstrates that Proposition 1 holds also for the case of monopoly, and
with strategic investment decisions. We will now see how such market power aﬀects the eﬃciency
of an investment agreement.
Let X(k) here denote the monopoly production volume, as deﬁned by
Ωz(X) + Ωzz(X)X ≡ Cx(X, k),
assuming that the second-order condition Πkk < 0 is fulﬁlled, and let P (k) ≡ Ωz(X(k)) be the
monopoly price. Absent investment protection, the host country will regulate for θ > Θ(k). The
corresponding optimal investment is
kM ≡ argmax
k≥0
[F (Θ(k))Π(k)−R(k)].
The equilibrium threshold for regulation θM is thus given by θM ≡ Θ(kM ).
The following Proposition, which we prove in Appendix A.7, identiﬁes circumstances under
which the fully eﬃcient outcome (θG, kG) can obtained through an investment agreement:
Proposition 8 Assume that the foreign investor has monopoly power, that there would be equilib-
rium overregulation absent any investment agreement (θM ≤ θG), and that the marginal production
externality is in the range Z θG
θ
Ψk(k
G,θ)dF (θ) ∈ [0, (1− F (θG))Rk(k
G)].
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The fully eﬃcient outcome (θG, kG) can then be implemented as a sub-game perfect equilibrium by
an investment agreement that stipulates the compensation rule
T (k, θ) =
(
Π(k) if θ ≤ θˆ
M
0 if θ > θˆ
M
,
where θˆ
M
= F−1(Rk(k
G)/Πk(k
G)) ≥ θG.
Note that the conditions that render (θG, kG) feasible under a carve-out policy are qualitatively very
similar to those under perfect competition, which were established in Proposition 3: ﬁrst, there is
room for a carve-out policy to improve regulatory performance (θM ≤ θG); second, there is under-
investment because of a non-negative marginal production externality; and third, the externality is
not so strong as to render full compensation optimal in all states of the world. We conclude that
the properties of optimal investment agreements do not depend critically on market structure and
the assumption about non-strategic investors.
5.4 Asymmetric information concerning regulatory shocks
We have thus far assumed ex post veriﬁability of the economic consequences of regulatory shocks.
But certain aspects of investment agreements are better understood assuming that host countries
have private information. For instance, Section 5.2 suggested asymmetric information as a rationale
for investment agreements to have stricter compensation rules for direct than for regulatory expro-
priations. We will here more formally consider the design of agreements when regulatory preferences
cannot be directly observed, thus allowing policy makers to misrepresent the true motives of their
regulations.
With θ being observed by the host country government only, it is no longer possible to implement
an agreement that awards compensation below a threshold θˆ, but nothing above. For realizations
θ > θN the host country would simply claim that θ > θˆ, in order to be allowed to regulate without
compensation. Incentive compatibility thus generally requires that host countries compensate ﬁrms
for regulatory interventions (the proof is provided in Appendix A.8):
Proposition 9 Assume that the host country is privately informed about the shock θ. For any
investment agreement that satisﬁes Contract Restrictions (1)-(4), and for which compensation at
most equals foregone operating proﬁt Πj(ki), there exists an alternative agreement that satisﬁes the
same restrictions and for the host country:
(i) features the compensation function
T (k,θ) ≡
(
Π(k) if θ ≤ θˆ
max{−S(k, θˆ); 0} if θ > θˆ;
(ii) yields weakly higher expected domestic welfare and foreign industry proﬁts than the initial agree-
ment.
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The optimal investment agreement under asymmetric information thus has a similar structure
to the one under full information, in that it requests full compensation of operating proﬁts Π(k)
for all shock realizations below a threshold value θˆ. But important diﬀerences arise for realizations
θ > θˆ. Under complete information, the host country will not be requested to compensate ﬁrms
subsequent to regulation, whereas compensation is required in the asymmetric information case to
achieve incentive compatibility. Under asymmetric information, therefore, there will be compensa-
tion payments in equilibrium, which is the case under complete information only if θˆ > θE .
The optimal compensation scheme in Proposition 9 violates Contract Restriction (5) for θ > θˆ
in two closely related respects. First, compensation is not based on foregone operating proﬁts, but
on the value to the host country of shutting down production. Second, investors will not receive
full compensation for θ ∈ (θˆ,ΘG(k)), since −S(k,θˆ) < Π(k) in this case.33 In the next Section we
explore in more detail the eﬃciency gains that can be achieved by increasing the degree of ﬂexibility
in the compensation schemes relative to Contract Restriction (5).
5.5 Other forms of compensation schemes
The level of investment protection θˆ is the only instrument under the carve-out policy (9) that
can be used for correcting ﬁrms’ investment incentives and the host country ex post incentive
to overregulate. This single instrument is suﬃcient if the marginal production externality is non-
negative, but not too large; see Proposition 3. However, it is necessary to introduce features that are
typically not found in actual agreements to achieve full eﬃciency when this externality is negative,
speciﬁcally by relaxing some of the constraints imposed by Contract Restrictions (1)-(5). In what
follows, we ﬁrst review a number of such schemes that have been analyzed in the literature, to
identify how they deviate from the compensation schemes we have considered so far, and we then
present an alternative eﬃcient scheme. To facilitate comparison, we recast the other models within
the context of our current framework.
Hermalin (1995) considers distortions to investments and regulation in a model with direct
expropriation and a single ﬁrm. He derives two eﬃcient mechanisms. In the ﬁrst mechanism, a
ﬁrm pays a production tax equal to the country’s value of seizing the asset. In our setting, a tax
equal to −S(k, θ) would implement the fully eﬃcient outcome. A tax system sophisticated enough
to induce each ﬁrm to internalize the full social cost of its actions would render any regulation
superﬂuous: The ﬁrm would voluntarily shut down production whenever the social cost exceeded the
beneﬁt. The second mechanism instead requests the host country to pay the ﬁrm the same amount
in compensation subsequent to expropriation. This feature highlights a fundamental property of
eﬃcient compensation, namely that it should be based also on the social cost and not only on
operating proﬁts. Even so, Hermalin’s (1995) second compensation rule is ineﬃcient under the
threat of indirect expropriation. It yields an expected compensation of −
R θ¯
θG
S(k, θ)dF (θ) in the
33The observation that the compensation is independent of the shock mirrors a standard result in auction theory
that the payment is independent of the winner’s (unobservable) valuation in an optimal auction (Myerson, 1981).
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current setting, which generally diﬀers from the expected compensation −
R θG
θ
S(k, θ)dF (θ) that
generates eﬃcient investment incentives. Eﬃciency requires the investor to internalize the marginal
eﬀect of the investment on the social value of allowing production rather than the value of shutting
it down.
Blume et al (1984) and Aisbett et al (2010a) discuss a deviation from Contract Restriction
(5), in which compensation is a linear combination of operating proﬁts and investment costs: T (k)
= δΠ(k) + αR(k).34 This compensation mechanism has two instruments (δ, α) that can be used to
correct the distortions to investment and regulation within our framework. It is easy to verify that
a special case of this compensation scheme, where
T (k,θ) =
(
Π(k) if θ ≤ θG
δΠ(k) + (1− δ)Π(k
G)
R(kG)
R(k) if θ > θG
(17)
implements the fully eﬃcient outcome (kG, θG) as a Nash equilibrium if and only if
δ ≡
F (θG)Π(kG)− F (θ
G)
1−F (θG)
R(kG)
Rk(kG)
R θG
θ
Ψk(k
G,θ)dF (θ)
F (θG)Π(kG)−R(kG) + R(k
G)
Rk(kG)
R θG
θ
Ψk(kG,θ)dF (θ)
> 0.
Eﬃciency of the carve-out policy (9) depends on veriﬁability of the regulatory shock θ; see the
discussion in Section 5.4. A virtue of (17) is that implementation does not require that the shock θ
is publicly observable.35 However, the compensation scheme deviates from those we have previously
considered in several respects. First, there are no carve-outs since compensation is paid for any
regulation, in line with the scheme in Proposition 9. Second, the scheme in (17) overcompensates
ﬁrms for their losses since T (k) > Π(k) for some investments k 6= kG.36 Yet another essential feature
of this scheme is that it relies on an ability to estimate the ﬁrm’s operating proﬁt Π(kG) and capital
cost R(kG) at the eﬃcient investment level kG. This is of questionable empirical relevance, and it
would presumably make its practical implementation diﬃcult. Both carve-out policies and (17) are
derived under the assumption that all ﬁrms are identical if an industry consists of more than one
ﬁrm. If ﬁrms in an industry diﬀer signiﬁcantly in terms of size and proﬁts, a fully eﬃcient carve-out
policy will require a unique threshold for compensation for each ﬁrm. The linear compensation rule
34 It is of interest to examine compensation schemes based upon other factors that operating proﬁts since the notion
of "fair market value" has been interpreted in diﬀerent ways in the case law. It is often interpreted to mean the
value of an asset if sold to an outside party, which in principle could be based on incurred investment costs. An
application of Theorem A.1 shows that linear compensation rules that incorporate both operating proﬁt and capital
costs are superior to rules that only depend on capital costs. Still, it does not seem to be a common practice to base
compensation on linear combinations of foregone operating proﬁts and incurred investment costs, which is an essential
feature of the scheme here.
35Notice that T (kG, θ) = Π(kG) = −S(kG, θG) for all θ implies that the net beneﬁt S(kG, θ) − S(kG, θG) to the
host country of allowing production is positive (negative) if θ < (>)θG evaluated at the investment level kG.
36Generically, Tk(k
G)−Πk(k
G) = (1−δ)(Π(k
G)
R(kG)
Rk(k
G)−Πk(k
G)) 6= 0. This implies T (k)−Π(k) > T (kG)−Π(kG) =
0 for some k 6= kG.
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(17) requires ﬁrm-speciﬁc δ to ensure that each ﬁrm faces correct investment incentives. Tailoring an
agreement to ﬁrm-level characteristics in this fashion can be done in commercial contracts between
host countries and individual investors concerning speciﬁc projects, but does not occur in state-to-
state treaties. Our analysis does not depend on ﬁrm-speciﬁc thresholds however, since we assume
that all ﬁrms in an industry face the same compensation rules and are simultaneously regulated.
Stähler (2016) derives a mechanism that can implement the globally eﬃcient solution under
asymmetric information about θ without information regarding kG. Also, it does not rely on
symmetry. Adapted to our setting, the compensation
T (k) =
eT + R ΘG(k)
θ
S(k,θ)dF (θ)
1− F (ΘG(k))
(18)
induces eﬃcient investment if regulation is ex post eﬃcient, i.e. if the host country applies the
regulatory threshold ΘG(k).37 In particular, T (k) only depends on the actual investment k. Ex
post eﬃcient regulation is ensured by requiring that the country pays compensation Π(k). This
scheme diﬀers from those in actual agreements since it requires that the host country payment
diﬀers from the compensation received by the ﬁrm. Stähler (2016) assumes that an arbitrator
enables the parties to break the payment balance in this fashion. The compensation rule is thus a
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves type of mechanism.
The compensation mechanisms reviewed above all have their merits, either in terms of simplicity
(carve-out policies), incentive compatibility (linear compensation as in (17)), or non-reliance on
eﬃcient investments (as in (18)). But they also have their shortcomings, either in terms of the
possibility for reaching an eﬃcient outcome or when it comes to practical implementation. We
show in Appendix A.9 that it is possible to implement the fully eﬃcient outcome and simultaneously
avoid drawbacks of the earlier models. Speciﬁcally, we let compensation be based on ﬁrms’ relative
performance. Such compensation could be relevant for cases where the same regulatory intervention
aﬀects multiple ﬁrms, so that several ﬁrms are potentially eligible for compensation; examples of
such instances are the termination of the renewable energy support schemes by Spain and other
countries, or the German shut down of nuclear power after Fukushima. The following result is made
more precise and proved in Appendix A.9:
Proposition 10 A compensation scheme that is based on relative performance can under certain
circumstances implement full eﬃciency even when this cannot be done with the optimal scheme
characterized in Proposition 1.
The speciﬁc eﬃcient compensation scheme we identify, see equation (A.18), diﬀers from (17) by
being based entirely on the investments that ﬁrms have actually made, instead of a counterfactual
37This is true even if the ﬁrm behaves strategically. Under the compensation rule (18), the expected proﬁt of the
ﬁrm equals
R ΘG(k)
θ
(S(k,θ)+Π(k))dF (θ)−R(k) + eT under ex post optimal regulation, which is identical to the social
welfare function up to a constant eT . The purpose of eT is only to ensure non-negative compensation, but we do not
deﬁne it here.
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of what ﬁrms would have earned at the eﬃcient outcome. Furthermore, the host country never
overcompensates the ﬁrms. The rule diﬀers from (18) by not relying on third-party participation.
Instead, it breaks the balance of payment between the host country and each individual ﬁrm by
simultaneously adjusting the compensation to other ﬁrms in the industry. Because the compensation
is based on the performance of similar ﬁrms, each ﬁrm is compensated for its operating proﬁt in
equilibrium.
The suggested compensation scheme can implement the fully eﬃcient outcome without informa-
tion regarding the shock θ. It is robust to asymmetric information in two other dimensions as well.
First, we previously assumed that policy makers in the host country ignore the eﬀect on operating
proﬁts in the decision whether to regulate. Some of the ﬁrms could be domestically or even state-
owned, or political preferences could aﬀect the way decision makers value proﬁt, and this could be
private information (Aisbett et al, 2010a). Also, policy makers have incentives to exaggerate the
extent to which they account for investor proﬁts. Our mechanism does not depend on host country
political incentives being observable; see Appendix A.9. Second, we have previously assumed that
ﬁrms’ operating proﬁts are observable. But productivity diﬀerences can in practice render oper-
ating proﬁts unobservable even if investments are the same across ﬁrms and common knowledge.
Firms could then have incentives to exaggerate the value of continued production to increase their
compensation. Our compensation rule is independent of the ﬁrm’s own proﬁt however, and no ﬁrm
therefore has any unilateral incentive to misreport it.38
Finally, the eﬃciency of the relative performance mechanism does not depend on ﬁrms being
identical. What is important, is that each ﬁrm can be placed in a comparison group with other
similar ﬁrms. However, the mechanism does not work if ﬁrms are very dissimilar, and in particular
not if the industry consists of a single ﬁrm.
6 Concluding remarks
The number of international investment agreements has increased dramatically since the mid-1980s,
and protection of foreign direct investment has become a core issue in the policy debate in developed
countries. But the economic literature hardly sheds any light on their appropriate design and
implications. We contribute to ﬁlling this void by examining optimal investment agreements that
share basic features with actual agreements.
Our model generates a wide range of results. We see the following as particularly relevant:
• Optimal investment agreements never induce host countries to permit production when reg-
ulation would increase joint welfare; there is no global regulatory chill ;
38Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) derive an optimal compensation mechanism with asymmetric information on
both sides when there is a single ﬁrm. Their compensation scheme features payments even if there is no regulation
and therefore violates Contract Restriction (4). They also consider the case where an arbitrator breaks the payment
balance.
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• A simple compensation scheme based solely on foregone operating proﬁts can fully resolve the
distortions in investment and regulation under a robust set of circumstances;
• The incentives to form investment agreements depend on the ability of host countries to make
unilateral commitments with regard to investment protection, as well as on the direction of
the potential investment ﬂows between the countries.
• Investment agreements between developed economies, such as TTIP, are likely to have strong
distributional implications by beneﬁting foreign investors at the expense of rest of society.
Agreements between developed and developing countries do not have these distributional
eﬀects, but are formed only if they increase domestic welfare in the developing countries.
We conclude by suggesting some avenues for future research. A common critique in the policy
debate concerns the legal standing of foreign investors in investment agreements through the ISDS
mechanisms. A key issue here is how a system that only allows foreign governments to litigate
would diﬀer from current ISDS systems. It seems intuitively plausible that ISDS systems imply
more active enforcement, but this is only a conjecture.
It has become increasingly common to include investment protection in trade agreements. Com-
plementarities between trade and investment undertakings can emanate for instance from global
value chains, or reﬂect an exchange of concessions in the investment and trade areas. However, the
precise form of interaction is unclear; see Maggi (2016) for an analytical taxonomy of various forms
of complementarities between undertakings in trade agreements. Our paper considers investment
agreements in isolation.
Extending the model to include a process of lobbying, as in Grossman and Helpman (1994,
1995), could further illuminate the politics of investment agreements. We simply assume that an
agreement is formed if and only if it increases welfare in each country.
In our model, investors’ only choice is whether or not to make a direct investment. An alterna-
tive could be to establish an arms-length arrangement with a local producer. Arms-length contracts
typically are incomplete and sometimes associated with hold-up problems between ﬁrms, as high-
lighted in the literature on outsourcing (Helpman, 2006, and Antràs and Rossi-Hansberg, 2009).
An advantage of arms-length contracts could be that a local producer is less likely to be regulated
than a vertically integrated foreign ﬁrm. Investment agreements could thus make outsourcing less
attractive through increased protection of foreign investment.
We consider the incentives to form a single bilateral investment agreement. But it is some-
times maintained that the surge of bilateral investment treaties between developed and developing
countries constitutes a race between developing countries to attract foreign investment. It there-
fore seems relevant to extend the analysis to a setting with competition for investment between
countries.
The analysis focuses for the most part on agreements fulﬁlling Contract Restrictions (1)-(5).
There is strong institutional support for these assumptions. But it might nevertheless be interesting
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to endogenize some of these incomplete contracting features, possibly within a contracting cost
framework similar to the one developed by Horn et al (2010) to endogenize the design of trade
agreements.
Finally, it is natural to start the analysis of investment agreements by analyzing the design and
implications of voluntary, optimal agreements. But agreements might in practice contain provisions
that are harmful to some of the involved partied because of poor drafting of the agreements, or
because of undesirable interpretations by arbitration panels. Much of the very recent literature
on investment agreements examines the consequences of exogenously imposed provisions. We view
these approaches as complementary to the present one.
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A Appendix
A.1 Properties of X i(ki), P
i(ki) and K
i(θˆi)
The expressions in (1) yield
Xik(ki) =
−Cjxk(X
i(ki), ki)
Cjxx(Xik(ki), ki)− Ω
i
zz(X
i
k(ki))
> 0, P ik(ki) = Ω
i
zz(X
i(ki))X
i
k(ki) < 0.
The positive slope of Ki(θˆi) is seen by diﬀerentiating (3):
Kiθ =
−f i(θˆi)C
j
k(X
i(kˆi), kˆi)
F i(θˆi)[C
j
xk(X
i(kˆi), kˆi)Xik(kˆi) + C
j
kk(X
i(kˆi), kˆi)] +R
j
kk(kˆi)
> 0.
Monotonicity of Ki(θˆi) follows from C
j
k < 0, the concavity of consumer utility and convexity of the
production and investment cost:
CjxkX
i
k + C
j
kk =
CjxxC
j
kk − C
j
xkC
j
kx − Ω
i
zzC
j
kk
Cjxx − Ωizz
> 0.
A.2 Properties of optimal compensation schemes
This Appendix proves statements made in Section 4 concerning properties of investment agreements,
using more general frameworks than those employed in the main text in several respects. First, it
makes more general assumptions concerning industry structure, for instance by allowing ﬁrms to
be heterogenous in various ways, and to be imperfectly competitive. Second, it considers a range
of diﬀerent scenarios with regard to contract restrictions, and to the behavior of investors. The
Appendix establishes that in each of these scenarios, any optimal investment agreement can be
characterized in terms of a threshold that yields domestic, but never global regulatory chill. For
certain scenarios we also establish properties of optimal compensation schemes.
Sections A.2.2 and A.2.3 focus on compensation schemes fulﬁlling Contract Restrictions (1)-(4),
but not necessarily Restriction (5). Proposition A.1 in Section A.2.2 assumes that ﬁrms invest
strategically to inﬂuence ex post regulatory decisions. A generalization of Proposition 1 in the
main text is provided in Proposition A.2 in Section A.2.3, which considers the case where ﬁrms
do not behave strategically. We then consider the consequences of more restrictive compensation
mechanisms that limit compensation to be proportional and at most equal to operating proﬁt.
Proposition A.3 in Section A.2.4 shows that the optimal compensation function is a carve-out policy
if investors behave strategically, and Proposition A.4 in Section A.2.5 establishes the same result
for non-strategic investors. Proposition A.5 in Section A.2.6 veriﬁes the optimality of a carve-out
policy under a monopoly market structure under the restriction that compensation is limited to at
most operating proﬁt, but compensation is not required to be proportional.
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A.2.1 A generalized model
There are two countries, indexed by i 6= j = 1, 2, and an industry with H ≥ 1 ﬁrms, indexed by
h = 1, 2..., H. Assume that each ﬁrm h invests khi in country i, so that kh = (kh1, kh2) is the
ﬁrm’s investment portfolio. Let k−hi = (k1i, .., k(h−1)i, k(h+1)i, .., kHi) be the investment proﬁle of
all ﬁrms in country i other than h, and denote by ki = (khi,k−hi) the full portfolio of investments in
country i. We assume that ﬁrms make their investment decisions simultaneously and independently
to maximize unilateral proﬁt, but do not make any assumptions about the nature of strategic
interaction in the investment stage nor in the product market. Let Πhi(ki) ≥ 0 be the reduced form
operating proﬁt of ﬁrm h of its facilities in country i, and assume that this proﬁt is independent of
whether country j is regulated or not. Obviously, Πhi(ki) = 0 if ﬁrm h does not have any facilities
in country i. Denote by Rh(kh) ≥ 0 ﬁrm h’s rental cost of capital, which is strictly positive if either
kh1 > 0 or kh2 > 0.
Let the reduced form domestic welfare be Si(ki, θi) under production and zero if there is regu-
lation. This domestic welfare depends on domestic investment ki and on the country-speciﬁc shock
θi. Let domestic welfare be strictly decreasing in θi for all ki ≥ 0 (where a weak inequality means
that khi > 0 for at least one ﬁrm and a strict inequality means that investments are strictly positive
for all ﬁrms). Assume that Si(ki, θi) and the proﬁt functions are continuous in ki.
Assume that θi is continuously distributed on [θi, θ¯i] with marginal cumulative distribution
function F i(θi) and marginal density f
i(θi). Firms make their investment decisions before the
shock is realized, but the countries may choose to regulate subsequent to observing the shock.
Regulation implies that the host country disallows the production of all ﬁrms in the industry in the
host country. Both countries take the decision to regulate simultaneously and independently.
Consider now the ex post optimal choice of country i whether to allow production absent an
investment agreement. Assume that country i attaches the weight γhi ∈ [0, 1] to the proﬁt of ﬁrm
h in its decision whether to regulate, and let γi = (γ1i, .., γhi, .., γHi). Denote by
∆i(ki, θi,γi) ≡ S
i(ki, θi) +
PH
h=1 γhiΠ
hi(ki)
the net beneﬁt to country i of allowing production. Let Θi(ki,γi) ≡ θi if ∆
i(ki, θi,γi) ≤ 0,
Θi(ki,γi) ≡ θ¯i if ∆
i(ki, θ¯i,γi) ≥ 0 and the implicit solution to ∆
i(ki,Θ
i,γi) ≡ 0 in the intermediate
case. We assume that the host country allows production if indiﬀerent. Country i will then allow
production if and only if θi ≤ Θ
i(ki,γi). The decision to regulate is independent of country j’s
actions due to the separability of the industries (the interrelationship that stems from the investment
cost does not aﬀect regulatory decisions). Deﬁne the threshold ΘiG(ki) ≡ Θ
i(ki,1) ≥ Θ
i(ki,γi).
This is the cut-oﬀ below which it is ex post optimal to allow production in country i if national
welfare is deﬁned by the sum of domestic welfare and industry operating proﬁt.
An international investment agreement (IIA) is a vector Tˆi = (Tˆ 1i, .., Tˆ hi, .., TˆHi) of compensa-
tion rules for each country, where Tˆ hi(ki, θi) ≥ 0 speciﬁes the compensation from the host country
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to ﬁrm h in case of regulation in country i. Notice that the compensation rule only depends on
domestic factors; a country thus never compensates for regulation abroad. .
The timing of the interaction is as follows:
1. The two countries jointly commit to an IIA with compensation rules Tˆ = (Tˆ1, Tˆ2);
2. Firms decide how much capital k to invest;
3. The shocks (θ1, θ2) are realized;
4. Country i observes θi and decides whether to regulate.
(a) If country i does not intervene, product market competition ensues in country i;
(b) If country i regulates, then the agreement pays compensation according to Tˆi.
A.2.2 General compensation schemes: Strategic investors
A subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the market game induced by IIA Tˆ consists of two com-
ponents. First, for any investment proﬁle k, the SPE deﬁnes two subsets of shock realizations
in each country, the set M i(ki, Tˆ
i) of θi for which the host country allows production and the
complementary set M ir(ki, Tˆ
i) of θi for which the host country regulates:
M i(ki, Tˆ
i) ≡ {θi : ∆
i(ki, θi,γi) +
PH
h=1(1− γhi)Tˆ
hi(ki, θi)} ≥ 0},
M ir(ki, Tˆ
ir) ≡ {θi /∈M
i(ki, Tˆ
i)}.
(A.1)
M i(ki, Tˆ
i) and M ir(ki, Tˆ
i) also depend on γi, but we subsume γi for notational simplicity. The
second component of the SPE under IIA Tˆ is the investment proﬁle kˆh = (kˆh1, kˆh2), which for all
ﬁrms h = 1, 2..., H is given by:
kˆh ∈ argmax
kh∈R
2
+
{
P
i=1,2[Π
hi(khi, kˆ−hi)
R
M i(khi,kˆ−hi,Tˆi)
dF i(θi)
+
R
M ir(khi,kˆ−hi,Tˆi)
Tˆ hi(khi, kˆ−hi, θi)dF
i(θi)]−R
h(kh)}.
(A.2)
In this expression, kˆ−hi = (kˆ1i, .., kˆ(h−1)i, kˆ(h+1)i, .., kˆHi) is the equilibrium investment proﬁle for all
ﬁrms except h in country i.
Equilibrium expected proﬁt and host country welfare. Let Mˆ i ≡M i(kˆi, Tˆ
i) be the subset
of shocks for which country i allows production in equilibrium, and let Mˆ ir ≡ M ir(kˆi, Tˆ
i) be the
events with regulation. Then
Π˜hi(Tˆ) ≡ Πhi(kˆi)
R
Mˆ i
dF i(θi) +
R
Mˆ ir
Tˆ hi(kˆi, θi)dF
i(θi) (A.3)
is the equilibrium expected operating proﬁt of ﬁrm h in market i, and Π˜h(Tˆ) ≡ Π˜h1(Tˆ)+Π˜h2(Tˆ) the
total expected proﬁt excluding capital costs Rh(kˆh). The equilibrium expected welfare of country
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i equals
V˜ i(Tˆ,γi) ≡
R
Mˆ i
(Si(kˆi, θi) +
PH
h=1 γhiΠ
hi(kˆi))dF
i(θi)
−
R
Mˆ ir
PH
h=1(1− γhi)Tˆ
hi(kˆi, θi)dF
i(θi)
+
PH
h=1 γhi[Π
hj(kˆj)
R
Mˆj
dF j(θj)
+
R
Mˆjr
Tˆ hj(kj , θj)dF
j(θj)]−
PH
h=1 γhiR
h(kˆh).
Let θˆ
G
i ≡ Θ
iG(kˆi) be the ex post eﬃcient level of regulation given the equilibrium investment kˆi, so
that Si(kˆi, θˆ
G
i ) = −
PH
h=1Π
hi(kˆi). Deﬁne the expected operating surplus in country i as
W˜ i(Tˆ) ≡
R
Mˆ i
(Si(kˆi, θi)− S
i(kˆi, θˆ
G
i ))dF
i(θi). (A.4)
We can then write the expected welfare of country i more compactly as
V˜ i(Tˆ,γi) = W˜
i(Tˆ) +
PH
h=1[γhi(Π˜
h(Tˆ)−Rh(kˆh))− Π˜
hi(Tˆ)]. (A.5)
Proposition A.1 Assume that all ﬁrms account for the eﬀect of their investment on regulation.
For any investment agreement that satisﬁes Contract Restrictions (1)-(4) there exists an alternative
agreement that satisﬁes the same restrictions, and that for each country i:
(i) implements a threshold function for regulation Θi∗(ki,γi) ∈ [Θ
i(ki,γi),Θ
iG(ki)];
(ii) yields weakly higher expected welfare and industry proﬁts than the initial agreement.
Proof: The method of proof is to show that for any IIA with compensation rule Tˆ satisfying
the appropriate restrictions, there exists another IIA with compensation rule T satisfying the same
restrictions, with the characteristics in the theorem and that yields weakly higher expected domestic
welfare and industry proﬁts than the initial agreement.
We ﬁrst use the threshold function Θi∗(ki,γi) (deﬁned below) to create four partitions of [θi, θ¯i]:
Ai(ki, Tˆ
i) ≡ {θi ∈M
i(ki, Tˆ
i) ∩ [θi,Θ
i∗(ki,γi)]}
Air(ki, Tˆ
i) ≡ {θi ∈M
ir(ki, Tˆ
i) ∩ [θi,Θ
i∗(ki,γi)]}
Bi(ki, Tˆ
i) ≡ {θi ∈M
i(ki, Tˆ
i) ∩ (Θi∗(ki,γi), θ¯i]}
Bir(ki, Tˆ
i) ≡ {θi ∈M
ir(ki, Tˆ
i) ∩ (Θi∗(ki,γi), θ¯i]}
Hence, "Ai" denotes sets of θi ≤ Θ
i∗(ki,γi), and "B
i" sets of θi > Θ
i∗(ki,γi). The presence or
absence of superscript "r" indicates whether or not there is regulation under the initial agreement Tˆ.
By construction, Ai(ki, Tˆ
i) ∪Bi(ki, Tˆ
i) =M i(ki, Tˆ
i) and Air(ki, Tˆ
i) ∪Bir(ki, Tˆ
i) =M ir(ki, Tˆ
i).
An alternative investment agreement. Let the agreement T = (T1,T2) be characterized by a
threshold Θi∗(ki,γi) for each country given by
F i(Θi∗(ki,γi)) ≡ min{
R
M i(ki,Tˆi)
dF i(θi);F
i(ΘiG(ki))} (A.6)
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and compensation requirements Ti = (T 1i, .., THi), where
T hi(ki, θi) =

Πhi(ki) θi ∈ A
i(ki, Tˆ
i) ∪Air(ki, Tˆ
i)
T˜ hi(ki) θi ∈ B
i(ki, Tˆ
i)
Tˆ hi(ki, θi) θi ∈ B
ir(ki, Tˆ
i)
, (A.7)
and where
T˜ hi(ki) ≡
1R
Bi(ki,Tˆi)
dF i(θ˜i)
{
R
Air(ki,Tˆi)
Tˆ hi(ki, θ˜i)dF
i(θ˜i)
+ max[
R
M i(ki,Tˆi)
dF i(θ˜i)− F
i(ΘiG(ki)); 0]Π
hi(ki)}
(A.8)
if
R
Bi(ki,Tˆi)
dF i(θ˜i) > 0. This alternative agreement builds on the payments under the original
compensation scheme and the operating proﬁts of regulated ﬁrms. Θi∗ therefore depends on γi
since M i(ki, Tˆ
i) depends on γi.
Establishing Θi∗(k,γi) ∈ [Θ
i(ki,γi),Θ
iG(ki)]. The inequality Θ
i∗(k,γi) ≤ Θ
iG(ki) follows di-
rectly from (A.6). Furthermore, Θi∗(k,γi) ≥ Θ
i(ki,γi) trivially holds if Θ
i(ki,γi) = θi. To
establish Θi∗(k,γi) ≥ Θ
i(ki,γi) for Θ
i(ki,γi) > θi, note that if F
i(ΘiG(ki)) ≤
R
M i(ki,Tˆi)
dF i(θi),
then F i(Θi∗(ki,γi)) = F
i(ΘiG(ki)) ≥ F
i(Θi(ki,γi)), where the inequality follows from Θ
iG(ki) ≥
Θi(ki,γi). Assume ﬁnally that
R
M i(ki,Tˆi)
dF i(θi) ≤ F
i(ΘiG(ki). The assumption that S
i(ki, θi) is
strictly decreasing in θi and Tˆ
hi(ki, θi) ≥ 0 jointly imply that
∆i(ki, θi,γi) +
PH
h=1(1− γhi)Tˆ
hi(ki, θi)
is strictly positive for all θi < Θ
i(ki,γi) in the initial agreement. Hence, [θi,Θ
i(ki,γi)) ⊂M
i(ki, Tˆ
i)
and therefore F i(Θi∗(ki,γi)) =
R
M i(ki,Tˆi)
dF i(θi) ≥ F
i(Θi(ki,γi)).
Country i allows production under agreement T iﬀ θi ≤ Θ
i∗(ki,γi). Consider the incentives
for the host country to regulate the industry under an arbitrary investment proﬁle ki for agreement
T and for diﬀerent realizations of the shock θi:
(i) θi ∈ A
i(ki, Tˆ
i)∪Air(ki, Tˆ
i) = [θi,Θ
i∗(ki,γi)]. By construction of the agreement, the net beneﬁt
of allowing production is non-negative for all θi ≤ Θ
i∗(ki,γi) ≤ Θ
iG(ki) because in this case
∆i(ki, θi,γi) +
PH
h=1(1− γhi)T
hi(ki,θi) = S
i(ki, θi) +
PH
h=1Π
hi(ki) ≥ 0.
(ii) θi ∈ B
ir(ki, Tˆ
i). It is optimal to regulate because the compensation function remains the same
as before, and it was optimal to regulate already under the initial agreement.
(iii) θi ∈ B
i(ki, Tˆ
i) and
R
Bi(ki,Tˆi)
dF i(θ˜
i
) > 0. By the construction of Θi∗(ki,γi):R
Bi(ki,Tˆi)
dF i(θ˜i) ≡
R
Air(ki,Tˆi)
dF i(θ˜i) + max{
R
M i(ki,Tˆi)
dF i(θ˜i)− F (Θ
iG(ki)); 0}. (A.9)
Use T˜ hi(ki) deﬁned in (A.8) and (A.9) to decompose the net beneﬁt of allowing production in
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country i as follows:
∆i(ki, θi,γi) +
PH
h=1(1− γhi)T˜
hi(ki)
=
R
Air(ki,Tˆi)
[Si(ki, θi)− S
i(ki, θ˜i)]dF
i(θ˜i)R
Bi(ki,Tˆi)
dF i(θ˜i)
+
R
Air(ki,Tˆi)
[∆i(ki, θ˜i,γi) +
PH
h=1(1− γhi)Tˆ
hi(ki, θ˜i)]dF
i(θ˜i)R
Bi(ki,Tˆi)
dF i(θ˜i)
+
[Si(ki, θi)− S
i(ki,Θ
iG(ki))]max{
R
M i(ki,Tˆi)
dF i(θ˜i)− F
i(ΘiG(ki)); 0}R
Bi(ki,Tˆi)
dF i(θ˜i)
Assume ﬁrst that
R
Air(ki,Tˆi)
dF i(θi) > 0. In this case, the term on the second row is strictly
negative because Siθ < 0 and θi > Θ
i∗(ki) ≥ θ˜i for all θi ∈ B
i(ki, Tˆ
i) and θ˜i ∈ A
ir(ki, Tˆ
i). The
term on the third row is strictly negative because regulation is optimal under contract Tˆ for all
θ˜i ∈ A
ir(ki, Tˆ
i). The term on the fourth row is zero if
R
M i(ki,Tˆi)
dF i(θ˜i) ≤ F
i(ΘiG(ki)) and strictly
negative otherwise because then θi > Θ
i∗(ki,γi) = Θ
iG(ki) for all θi ∈ B
i(ki, Tˆ
i). Both terms on
the second and third row vanish if
R
Air(ki,Tˆi)
dF i(θi) = 0. But then
R
M i(ki,Tˆi)
dF i(θ˜i) > F (Θ
iG(ki))
by (A.9) so the third term is strictly negative.
We conclude that it is ex post optimal for the host country to allow production if and only if
θi ≤ Θ
i∗(ki,γi) under the compensation rule T.
Investments and proﬁts are the same under both agreements. By way of the threshold
Θi∗(ki,γi) for regulation deﬁned in (A.6) and the compensation rules (A.7)-(A.8), the expected
operating proﬁt of ﬁrm h active in country i under the modiﬁed agreement T becomes
Πhi(ki)F
i(Θi∗(ki,γi)) + T˜
hi(ki)
R
Bi(ki,Tˆi)
dF i(θi) +
R
Bir(ki,Tˆi)
Tˆ hi(ki, θi)dF
i(θi)
= Πhi(ki)
R
M i(ki,Tˆi)
dF i(θi) +
R
M ir(ki,Tˆi)
Tˆ hi(ki, θi)dF
i(θi)
after simpliﬁcations. This is exactly the same expected operating proﬁt as under the original
agreement Tˆ for every possible investment proﬁle ki. Hence, kˆ can be sustained as an equilibrium
investment proﬁle also under the modiﬁed agreement T.
It follows directly from the observation that operating proﬁts and the equilibrium investments
are the same under both agreements that Π˜h1(T) = Π˜h1(Tˆ), Π˜h2(T) = Π˜h2(Tˆ) and Π˜h(T) = Π˜h(Tˆ)
for all h.
Expected welfare of both countries is weakly higher under agreement T. The equilibrium
welfare of country i equals
V˜ i(T,γi) ≡ W˜
i(T) +
PH
h=1[γhi(Π˜
h(T)−Rh(kˆh))− Π˜
hi(T)]
= W˜ i(T) +
PH
h=1[γhi(Π˜
h(Tˆ)−Rh(kˆh))− Π˜
hi(Tˆ)]
under agreement T, where
W˜ i(T) ≡
R θˆ∗i
−∞(S
i(kˆi, θi)− S
i(kˆi, θˆ
G
i ))dF
i(θi),
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θˆ
∗
i = Θ
i∗(kˆi,γi), and the second row of V˜
i(T,γi) follows from equilibrium proﬁts and investments
being the same for all ﬁrms under both agreements. Hence,
V˜ i(T,γi)− V˜
i(Tˆ,γi) = W˜
i(T)− W˜ i(Tˆ)
=
R θˆ∗i
θi
(Si(kˆi, θi)− S(kˆi, θˆ
G
i ))dF
i(θi)
−
R
Aˆi
(Si(kˆi, θi)− S
i(kˆi, θˆ
G
i ))dF
i(θi)
−
R
Bˆi
(Si(kˆi, θi)− S
i(kˆi, θˆ
G
i ))dF
i(θi),
where Aˆi = Ai(kˆi, Tˆ
i) and Bˆi = Bi(kˆi, Tˆ
i). Adding and subtracting Si(kˆi, θˆ
∗
i ) underneath the
three integrals yields
W˜ i(T)− W˜ i(Tˆ) =
R
Aˆir
(Si(kˆi, θi)− S
i(kˆi, θˆ
∗
i ))dF
i(θi)
+
R
Bˆi
(Si(kˆi, θˆ
∗
i )− S
i(kˆi, θi))dF
i(θi)
+(Si(kˆi, θˆ
∗
i )− S(kˆi, θˆ
G
i ))(F
i(θˆ
∗
i )−
R
Mˆ i
dF i(θi))
after simpliﬁcations, where Aˆir = Air(kˆi, Tˆ
i). The expressions on the ﬁrst two rows are both non-
negative because Si is decreasing in θi, θi ≤ θˆ
∗
i in the domain Aˆ
ir, and θi > θˆ
∗
i in the domain Bˆ
i.
The term on the ﬁnal row is zero if
R
Mˆ i
dF i(θi) ≥ F
i(θˆ
G
i ) because then θˆ
∗
i = θˆ
G
i . It is zero also
if
R
Mˆ i
dF i(θi) < F
i(θˆ
G
i ) because then F
i(θˆ
∗
i ) =
R
Mˆ i
dF i(θi). It follows that W˜
i(T) ≥ W˜ i(Tˆ) and
therefore V˜ i(T,γi) ≥ V˜
i(Tˆ,γi) for both countries i = 1, 2.
We have thus shown that for any IIA with arbitrary non-negative compensation Tˆ that is paid if
and only if the host country disallows production, we can ﬁnd another compensation rule T that
is paid if and only if the host country disallows production, that increases regulatory eﬃciency,
but without aﬀecting equilibrium investments. We characterized one such compensation rule in
(A.7)-(A.8), but many other compensation rules can sustain the same result.
Our speciﬁc compensation rule yields a compensation T hi to ﬁrm h in country i that is a convex
combination of that ﬁrm’s operating proﬁt Πhi and the compensation Tˆ hi in the original scheme,
where the weights on the two components are country-speciﬁc and depend on θi, but are the same
for all ﬁrms that have invested in country i. This structure implies that the modiﬁed scheme T
inherits a number of characteristics from the original scheme Tˆ. First, compensation is non-negative
because operating proﬁt is non-negative and the original compensation is non-negative (Πhi ≥ 0 and
Tˆ hi ≥ 0 imply T hi ≥ 0). Second, it does not rely on excessive compensation (punitive damages) if
this is not part of the original scheme (Tˆ hi ≤ Πhi implies T hi ≤ Πhi). Third, the modiﬁed scheme is
non-discriminatory if the original scheme is non-discriminatory. Fourth, the modiﬁed compensation
rule is linear in operating proﬁt and capital cost if the original scheme has those characteristics.
The statements in Proposition A.1 would thus hold also for stricter restrictions on IIAs than those
imposed by Contract Restrictions (1)-(4), and the non-negative compensation requirement. It also
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shows that linear compensation rules that incorporate both operating proﬁts and incurred capital
costs are superior to rules that compensate incurred capital costs only, as discussed in Section 5.5.
A.2.3 General compensation schemes: Non-strategic investors
The above results are based on the assumption that ﬁrms take into account how their investments
aﬀect the probability of being regulated. In this case, SPE is the appropriate equilibrium concept.
We next assume that ﬁrms treat the probability of host country intervention as being exogenous
to their own investment, in which case the Nash equilibrium (NE) is the appropriate equilibrium
concept. Given the investment agreement Tˆ, an NE deﬁnes two subsets of shock realizations in
each country, the set Mˆ i of θi for which the host country allows production and the complementary
set Mˆ ir of θi for which the host country regulates and an investment proﬁle kˆi, such that allowing
production and regulation are both ex post optimal given kˆi and the realization of the shock:
Mˆ i ≡ {θi : ∆
i(kˆi, θi,γi) +
PH
h=1(1− γhi)Tˆ
hi(kˆi, θi)} ≥ 0},
Mˆ ir ≡ {θi /∈ Mˆ
i,
(A.10)
and kˆh = (kˆh1, kˆh2) represents a proﬁt maximizing investment portfolio of ﬁrm h given kˆ−hi, Mˆ
i
and Mˆ ir:
kˆh ∈ argmax
kh∈R
2
+
{
P
i=1,2[Π
hi(khi, kˆ−hi)
R
Mˆ i
dF i(θi)
+
R
Mˆ ir
Tˆ hi(khi, kˆ−hi, θi)dF
i(θi)]−R
h(kh)}.
(A.11)
Every SPE is contained in the set of NEs, so (Mˆ i, Mˆ ir) and kˆi as deﬁned in (A.10)-(A.11) represent
Nash equilibrium outcomes of the market game induced by IIA Tˆ. The expected welfare V˜ i(Tˆ,γi)
of country i and the operating proﬁts Π˜hi(Tˆ) and Π˜h(Tˆ) of each ﬁrm h are unaﬀected by this change
in equilibrium concept.
Proposition A.2 Assume that all ﬁrms treat regulation as exogenous to their own investment.
For any investment agreement that satisﬁes Contract Restrictions (1)-(4) there exists an alternative
agreement that satisﬁes the same restrictions, and that for each country i:
(i) implements a threshold function for regulation Θi∗(ki,γi) ∈ [Θ
i(ki,γi),Θ
iG(ki)];
(ii) yields weakly higher expected welfare and industry proﬁts than the initial agreement.
Proof: For any initial agreement Tˆ, deﬁne the modiﬁed agreement T by (A.6)-(A.8). It is then
optimal for country i to allow production if and only if θi ≤ Θ
i∗(ki,γi) ∈ [Θ
i(ki,γi),Θ
iG(ki)]
for any realized investment proﬁle ki, as was shown already in the proof of Proposition A.1. In
particular, country i allows production for the investment proﬁle kˆi if and only if θi ≤ θˆ
∗
i , where
F i(θˆ
∗
i ) ≡ min{
R
Mˆ i
dF i(θi);F
i(θˆ
G
i )}.
The expected operating proﬁt of ﬁrm h active in country i becomes
Πhi(khi, kˆ−hi)F
i(θˆ
∗
i ) + T˜
hi(khi, kˆ−hi)
R
Bˆi
dF i(θi) +
R
Bˆir
Tˆ hi(khi, kˆ−hi, θi)dF
i(θi)
= Πhi(khi, kˆ−hi)
R
Mˆ i
dF i(θi) +
R
Mˆ ir
Tˆ hi(khi, kˆ−hi, θi)dF
i(θi)
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under the modiﬁed agreement T, given the investment proﬁle kˆ−hi of all other ﬁrms active in
country i and the expectation that Ai(khi, kˆ−hi, Tˆ
i) = Aˆi, Air(khi, kˆ−hi, Tˆ
i) = Aˆir, and so forth.
The expected operating proﬁt is exactly the same as under the original agreement. Hence, the
thresholds (θˆ
∗
1, θˆ
∗
2) and investment proﬁle kˆ can be implemented as a Nash Equilibrium by means
of the compensation rules T = (T1,T2). And since the domestic welfare, all operating proﬁts
and investment are the same as before, it follows that the alternative agreement T represents an
expected improvement for all parties even under Nash implementation.
Proposition 1 in the main text is a special case of Proposition A.2 above, with one representative
ﬁrm in each country investing only in FDI, and where γhi = 0 for the foreign ﬁrm h investing in
country i.
Propositions A.1 and A.2 characterize the ex post optimal regulation for any θi, and the optimal
compensation for θi ≤ Θˆ
i∗(ki,γi). However, the theorems are silent about the optimal compensation
for θi > Θˆ
i∗(ki,γi) because the modiﬁed compensation scheme T = (T
1,T2) is deﬁned relative to
some initial and arbitrary compensation scheme Tˆ = (Tˆ1, Tˆ2) in this case. To obtain sharper results
in this regard we need to place more structure on permissible compensation schemes. To this end,
we require that agreements fulﬁl Contract Restriction (5), stipulating proportional compensation
schemes:
Tˆ hi(ki, θi) ≡ bi(θi)Π
hi(ki), bi(θi) ∈ [0, 1]. (A.12)
A.2.4 Proportional compensation schemes: Strategic investors
We will be interested in each country’s unilateral incentive to optimize investment protection. As-
sume therefore that only country i is restricted to Tˆi with proportional compensation as in (A.12)
whereas country j has some arbitrary compensation mechanism Tˆj . An SPE of the game induced
by IIA Tˆ still deﬁnes a production set M i(ki, Tˆ
i) and regulation set M ir(ki, Tˆ
i) by (A.1), but the
equilibrium investment condition changes to
kˆh ∈ argmax
kh∈R
2
+
{Πhi(khi, kˆ−hi)[
R
M i(khi,kˆ−hi,Tˆi)
dF i(θi) +
R
M ir(khi,kˆ−hi,Tˆi)
bi(θi)dF
i(θi)]
+ Πhj(khj , kˆ−hj)
R
Mj(khj ,kˆ−hj ,Tˆj)
dF j(θj) +
R
Mjr(khj ,kˆ−hj ,Tˆi)
Tˆ hj(khj , kˆ−hj , θj)dF
j(θi)−R
h(kh)}
for all h = 1, 2..., H. In this case, Proposition A.1 can be tightened considerably:
Proposition A.3 Assume that all ﬁrms account for the eﬀect of their investment on regulation.
For any investment agreement that satisﬁes Contract Restrictions (1)-(5) there exists an alternative
agreement that satisﬁes the same restrictions, and that for each country i:
(i) features the following compensation function for each ﬁrm h
T hi(ki, θi) ≡
(
Πhi(ki) θi ≤ Θˆ
i(ki,γi)
0 θi > Θˆ
i(ki,γi).
(A.13)
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(ii) implements a threshold function for regulation Θi∗(ki) ∈ {Θ
i(ki,γi); Θ
iG(ki)};
(iii) yields weakly higher expected domestic welfare and industry proﬁts than the initial agreement.
Proof: A compensation rule Tˆi that limits the compensation to each ﬁrm in country i to at most
its operating proﬁt implies
∆i(ki, θi,γi) +
PH
h=1(1− γhi)Tˆ
hi(ki, θi) ≤ S
i(ki, θi) +
PH
h=1Π
hi(ki),
in which case there will be regulation for all shocks above θi > Θ
iG(ki) under any investment
protection scheme. Hence, M i(ki, Tˆ
i) ⊂ [θi,Θ
iG(ki)) in the notation of Proposition A.1, which in
turn implies
F i(Θi∗(ki,γi)) =
R
M i(ki,Tˆi)
dF i(θ) ≤ F i(ΘiG(ki)). (A.14)
An alternative compensation scheme. Consider the threshold Θˆi(ki,γi) deﬁned by
F i(Θˆi(ki,γi)) ≡
R
M i(ki,Tˆi)
dF i(θi) +
R
M ir(ki,Tˆi)
b(θi)dF
i(θi) ≤ 1 (A.15)
and the compensation mechanism (A.13).
Establishing Θˆi(ki,γi) ≥ Θ
i(ki,γi). A comparison of (A.15) and (A.14) yields Θˆ
i(ki,γi) ≥
Θi∗(ki,γi), whereas Θ
i∗(ki,γi)) ≥ Θ
i(ki,γi) by the assumption that compensation is non-negative;
see the proof of Proposition A.1.
Country i allows production under Ti iﬀ θi ≤ min{Θˆ
i(ki,γi); Θ
iG(ki)}. The net beneﬁt of
allowing production given T equals
∆i(ki, θi,γi) +
PH
h=1(1− γhi)T
hi(ki, θi) = S
i(ki, θi) +
PH
h=1Π
hi(ki)
if θi ≤ Θˆ
i(ki,γi) and is non-negative if θi ≤ Θ
iG(ki). We have already shown that it is ex post
optimal for the host country to disallow production for all θi > Θ
iG(ki) if compensation to each ﬁrm
is at most Πhi(ki). If Θ
iG(ki) ≤ Θˆ
i(ki,γi), then we are done. If Θˆ
i(ki,γi) < Θ
iG(ki), then the net
beneﬁt of allowing production is given by ∆i(ki, θi,γi) in the range θi ∈ (Θˆ
i(ki,γi),Θ
iG(ki)], which
is strictly negative by Θˆi(ki,γi) ≥ Θ
i(ki,γi). We conclude that it is ex post optimal for country
i to allow production if and only if θi ≤ min{Θˆ
i(ki,γi); Θ
iG(ki)} if all ﬁrms receive compensation
according to T hi deﬁned in (A.13).
Investments and proﬁts are the same under the two agreements. Firm h receives its
operating proﬁt Πhi(ki) for all θi ≤ Θˆ
i(ki,γi) independently of whether it is regulated or not. It is
regulated, but receives no compensation for all θi > Θˆ
i(ki,γi). Hence, ﬁrm h’s expected operating
proﬁt in country i equals
Πhi(ki)F
i(Θˆi(ki,γi)) = Π
hi(ki)[
R
M i(ki,Tˆi)
dF i(θi) +
R
M ir(ki,Tˆi)
b(θi)dF
i(θi)],
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which is the same expected operating proﬁt as under the original agreement Tˆi for every possible
investment proﬁle ki. Neither Tˆ
j nor the incentives to regulate have changed in country j, so kˆ can
be sustained as an equilibrium investment proﬁle also under (Ti, Tˆj).
Equilibrium operating proﬁts and investments are independent of whether country i oﬀers Tˆi
or Ti, so Π˜hi(Ti, Tˆj) = Π˜hi(Tˆ), Π˜hj(Tˆj ,´Ti) = Π˜hj(Tˆ) and Π˜h(Ti, Tˆj) = Π˜h(Tˆ) for all h.
Expected welfare of both countries is weakly higher under agreement T. Welfare in
country j is not aﬀected by the change from Tˆi to Ti in country i as long as the equilibrium
investments are unaltered, because there are no regulatory spill-overs between the two countries.
Hence, V˜ j(Tˆj ,Ti,γj) = V˜
j(Tˆ,γj). Expected welfare in country i is still deﬁned by (A.5) under Tˆ,
and by
V˜ i(Ti, Tˆj ,γi) ≡ W˜
i(Ti, Tˆj) +
PH
h=1(γhi(Π
h(Tˆ)−Rh(kˆh))−Π
hi(Tˆ))
under the alternative conﬁguration (Ti, Tˆj) of compensation schemes, where
W˜ i(Ti, Tˆj) ≡
R min{θˆi;θˆGi }
θi
(Si(kˆi, θi)− S
i(kˆi, θˆ
G
i ))dF
i(θi)
and θˆi = Θˆ
i(kˆi). The welfare diﬀerence equals
V˜ i(Ti, Tˆj ,γi)− V˜
i(Tˆ,γi) =
R min{θˆi;θˆGi }
θi
(Si(kˆi, θi)− S
i(kˆi, θˆ
G
i ))dF
i(θi)
−
R
Mˆ i
(Si(kˆi, θi)− S
i(kˆi, θˆ
G
i ))dF
i(θi)
Adding and subtracting Si(kˆi,min{θˆi; θˆ
G
i }) underneath the two integrals yields
V˜ i(Ti, Tˆj ,γi)− V˜
i(Tˆ,γi) =
R
Mˆ ir∩[θi,min{θˆi;θˆ
G
i }]
(Si(kˆi, θi)− S
i(kˆi,min{θˆi; θˆ
G
i }))dF
i(θi)
+
R
Mˆ i∩(min{θˆi;θˆ
G
i },θˆ
G
i ]
(Si(kˆi,min{θˆi; θˆ
G
i })− S
i(kˆi, θi))dF
i(θi)
+[Si(kˆi,min{θˆi; θˆ
G
i })− S
i(kˆi, θˆ
G
i )][F
i(min{θˆi; θˆ
G
i })−
R
Mˆ i
dF i(θi)]
after simpliﬁcation. By the assumption that Si is decreasing in θi, θi ≤ min{θˆi; θˆ
G
i } for all θi ∈
Mˆ ir ∩ (θi,min{θˆi; θˆ
G
i }] and θi ≥ min{θˆi; θˆ
G
i } for all θi ∈ Mˆ
i ∩ (min{θˆi; θˆ
G
i }, θˆ
G
i ], it follows that the
expressions on the ﬁrst two rows are non-negative. Also the term on the third row is non-negative.
The ﬁrst term in square brackets is non-negative by the assumption that Si is decreasing in θi and
min{θˆi; θˆ
G
i } ≤ θˆ
G
i . The second term in square brackets is non-negative because
F i(θˆi)−
R
Mˆ i
dF i(θi) =
R
Mˆ ir
b(θi)dF
i(θi) ≥ 0
by (A.15) and
F i(θˆ
G
i ) ≥ F
i(θˆ
∗
i ) =
R
Mˆ i
dF i(θ)
by (A.14). Hence, V i(Ti, Tˆ
j
,γi) ≥ V
i(Tˆ,γi). It follows that a unilateral deviation by country i
from Tˆi to Ti represents an improvement in the expected welfare of country i without aﬀecting
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the welfare in country j or the expected proﬁts of ﬁrms negatively. Analogously, we can show the
same result for a unilateral deviation by country j from Tˆj to Tj if even country j is restricted
to proportional compensation mechanisms. Hence, T = (T1,T2) is a (weakly) better policy than
Tˆ for both parties to an international investment agreement and to ﬁrms under the restriction to
proportional compensation.
A.2.5 Proportional compensation schemes: Non-strategic investors
Consider ﬁnally the consequences of proportional compensation in country i under the assumption
that ﬁrms treat the probability of regulation as exogenous to the own investment and the game is
solved in terms of Nash equilibrium. An NE of the game induced by Tˆ deﬁnes a production set Mˆ i
and regulation set Mˆ ir by (A.10) as a function of the equilibrium investment proﬁle kˆi, with the
new equilibrium investment condition for all h = 1, 2..., H:
kˆh ∈ argmax
kh∈R
2
+
{Πhi(khi, kˆ−hi)[
R
Mˆ i
dF i(θi) +
R
Mˆ ir
bi(θi)dF
i(θi)]
+ Πhj(khj , kˆ−hj)
R
Mˆj
dF j(θj) +
R
Mˆjr
Tˆ hj(khj , kˆ−hj , θj)dF
j(θi)−R
h(kh)}.
Proposition A.4 Assume that all ﬁrms treat regulation as exogenous to their own investment.
For any investment agreement that satisﬁes Contract Restrictions (1)-(5) there exists an alternative
agreement that satisﬁes the same restrictions, and that for each country i:
(i) features the compensation function
T hi(ki, θi) =
(
Πhi(ki) if θi ≤ θˆi
0 if θi > θˆi.
(A.16)
(ii) implements a threshold function for regulation
Θi∗(ki) ≡

Θi(ki) if θˆi < Θ
i(ki)
θˆi if θˆi ∈ [Θ
i(ki),Θ
iG(ki)]
ΘiG(ki) if θˆi > Θ
iG(ki);
(iii) yields weakly higher expected domestic welfare and foreign industry proﬁts than the initial
agreement.
Proof: For an arbitrary compensation rule Tˆi, consider the properties of an alternative compen-
sation rule Ti in country i characterized in terms of a threshold θˆi given by
F i(θˆi) =
R
Mˆ i
dF i(θi) +
R
Mˆ ir
bi(θi)dF
i(θi) ≤ 1
and where the compensation to each ﬁrm is characterized by (A.16).
We already know from the proof of Proposition A.1 that it is optimal for country i to allow
production for all θi ≤ Θ
i(ki,γi) for any mechanism with non-negative compensation. In the proof
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of Proposition A.3, we also showed that it is ex post optimal to regulate for all θi > Θˆ
iG(ki) for
any mechanism that restricts the host payment to at most the industry operating proﬁt. If θˆi >
Θi(ki,γi), then it is optimal to allow production for θi ≤ min{θˆi; Θˆ
iG(ki)} under the proportional
mechanism because then
∆i(ki, θi,γi) +
PH
h=1(1− γhi)T
hi(ki, θi) = S
i(ki, θi) +
PH
h=1Π
hi(ki) ≥ 0.
If θˆi < Θ
iG(ki), then it is optimal to regulate for all shocks θi > max{θˆi; Θ
i(ki,γi)} under the
proportional mechanism because then
∆i(ki, θi,γi) +
PH
h=1(1− γhi)T
hi(ki, θi) = ∆
i(ki, θi,γi) < 0.
With the anticipated regulation level θˆi and proportional compensation rule T
hi(ki, θi) in coun-
try i, and given Tˆj in country j, it is still optimal for ﬁrm h to invest kˆh if the other ﬁrms maintain
their investments at the same level as before. And since the equilibrium investments, the expected
operating proﬁts and the domestic welfare in country i are the same as in Proposition A.3, the
implications for expected country welfare and operating proﬁts follow.
Proposition 2 in the main text is a special case of Proposition A.4 above, with bi(θi) ∈ {0, 1}, one
representative ﬁrm in each country investing only in FDI, and where γhi = 0 for the foreign ﬁrm h
investing in country i.
A.2.6 Restricted compensation schemes: Monopoly
Reduce the number of ﬁrms in the industry in country i to one, and assume that this monopoly
accounts for the eﬀect on regulation when it decides how much to invest. Now a carve-out policy is
optimal within a broader class of rules than those that require proportional compensation (A.12):
Proposition A.5 Assume that the industry in country i consists of a monopoly that behaves strate-
gically. For any investment agreement that satisﬁes Contract Restrictions (1)-(4), and for which
compensation at most equals foregone operating proﬁt Πj(ki), there exists an alternative agreement
that satisﬁes the same ﬁve restrictions, and that for each country i:
(i) features the compensation function
T i(ki, θi) ≡
(
Πj(ki) θi ≤ Θˆ
i(ki, γi)
0 θi > Θˆ
i(ki, γi).
(A.17)
(ii) implements a threshold function for regulation min{Θˆi(ki, γi); Θ
iG(ki)} ≥ Θ
i(ki, γi);
(iii) yields weakly higher expected welfare in both countries and foreign industry proﬁts than the
initial agreement.
54
Henrik Horn and Thomas Tangerås
Proof: For any arbitrary compensation rule Tˆ i(ki, θi) ∈ [0,Π
j(ki)], deﬁne the threshold Θˆ
i(ki, γi)
by
F i(Θˆi(ki, γi)) ≡
R
M i(ki,Tˆ i)
dF i(θi) +
R
M ir(ki,Tˆ i)
Tˆ i(ki, θi)
Πj(ki)
dF i(θi) ≤ 1
and the compensation mechanism by (A.17). The proofs that Θˆi(ki, γi) ≥ Θ
i(ki, γi) and that
country i allows production if and only if θi ≤ min{Θˆ
i(ki, γi); Θ
iG(ki)} are analogous to the proofs
of the same results in Proposition A.3 and therefore omitted.
Investments and proﬁts are the same under the two agreements. The monopoly receives
its operating proﬁt Πj(ki) for all θi ≤ Θˆ
i(ki, γi) independently of whether it is regulated or not. It is
regulated, but receives no compensation for all θi > Θˆ
i(ki, γi). The monopoly’s expected operating
proﬁt in country i thus equals
Πj(ki)F
i(Θˆi(ki, γi)) = Π
j(ki)
R
M i(ki,Tˆ i)
dF i(θi) +
R
M ir(ki,Tˆ i)
Tˆ i(ki, θi)dF
i(θi),
which is the same expected operating proﬁt in country i as under the original agreement Tˆ i for every
possible investment proﬁle ki. Neither Tˆ
j nor the incentives to regulate have changed in country j,
so kˆi and kˆj can be sustained as an equilibrium investment proﬁles also under (T
i, Tˆj).
The proofs that welfare in country j remains the same, that all ﬁrms are equally well oﬀ as before
and that welfare in country i is weakly higher under compensation rule T i than Tˆ i are identical to
those in Proposition A.3. Hence, it is unnecessary to repeat those steps here.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 1
Let θˆ
B
i be the ﬁrm’s consistent belief about investment protection and kˆ
B
i ≡ K
i(θˆ
B
i ) its proﬁt
maximizing investment subsequent to the announcement of θˆi ≤ θ
N
i . The ﬁrm will earn its full
operating proﬁt if θi ≤ max{θˆi; Θ
i(kˆBi )} and obtain zero proﬁt otherwise. Hence, the ﬁrm’s beliefs
about investment protection is consistent with host country regulation only if θˆ
B
i ∈ {θˆi; θ
N
i } because
θˆ
B
i = Θ
i(kˆBi ) if and only if θˆ
B
i = θ
N
i by assumption (7). Assume that θˆi < θ
N
i and suppose θˆ
B
i = θˆi. In
this case, the host country optimally permits production if and only if θi ≤ Θ
i(Ki(θˆi)) > θˆi = θˆ
B
i ,
which is inconsistent. Hence, the only candidate for consistent beliefs is θˆ
B
i = θ
N
i for θˆi ≤ θ
N
i .
The optimal investment then equals kNi = K
i(θNi ), and the threshold for regulation occurs at
Θi(Ki(θNi )) = θ
N
i , which veriﬁes consistency in this ﬁnal case.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 2
Consider ﬁrst the properties of θNNNTOnly. Observe that
S˜(θˆ) + W˜ (θˆ) = 2S˜(θˆ) + Π˜(θˆ)
implies a welfare diﬀerence
S˜(θU ) + W˜ (θU )− S˜(θˆ)− W˜ (θˆ) = 2[S˜(θU )− S˜(θˆ)] + Π˜(θU )− Π˜(θˆ),
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which is strictly positive for all θˆ < θU . Hence, θNNNTOnly ≥ θ
U . Alternatively,
S˜(θˆ) + W˜ (θˆ) = 2W˜ (θˆ)− Π˜(θˆ),
which implies a welfare diﬀerence
S˜(θW ) + W˜ (θW )− S˜(θˆ)− W˜ (θˆ) = 2[W˜ (θW )− W˜ (θˆ)] + Π˜(θˆ)− Π˜(θW ),
which is strictly positive for all θˆ > θW . Hence, θNNNTOnly ≤ θ
W . To establish strict inequalities,
assume that θNNNTOnly ∈ (θ
N , θ¯). It is obviously the case that θNNNTOnly > θ
U if θU = θN , but
θNNNTOnly > θ
U also if θU > θN because then
S˜θ(θ
U ) + W˜θ(θ
U ) = Π˜θ(θ
U ) > 0.
Similarly, θNNNTOnly < θ
W if θW = θ¯, but θNNNTOnly < θ
W also if θW < θ¯ because then
S˜θ(θ
W ) + W˜θ(θ
W ) = −Π˜θ(θ
W ) < 0.
Consider next the properties of θNSNT :
S˜(θNNNTOnly) + W˜ (θ
NN
NTOnly) ≥ S˜(θˆ) + W˜ (θˆ)
and Π˜(θNNNTOnly) > Π˜(θˆ) for all θˆ < θ
NN
NTOnly imply θ
NS
NT ≥ θ
NN
NTOnly. The inequality is strict if
θNNNTOnly ∈ (θ
N , θ¯) because then
S˜θ(θ
NN
NTOnly) + W˜θ(θ
NN
NTOnly) = 0,
but Π˜θ(θ
NN
NTOnly) > 0.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 3
The second derivative of the welfare function W˜ (θˆ) = S˜(θˆ) + Π˜(θˆ) equals
W˜θθ(θˆ) = W˜θ(θˆ)
Kθθ(θˆ)
Kθ(θˆ)
+ [
d
dk
R ΘG(kˆ)
−∞ (Sk(kˆ, θ) + Πk(kˆ))dF (θ)−Rkk(kˆ)](Kθ(θˆ))
2
for θˆ ≥ θE . Every solution W˜θ(θˆ) = 0 in the domain θˆ ≥ θ
E is a local maximum by the concavity
assumption
d2
dk2
[
Z ΘG(k)
θ
(S(k, θ) + Π(k))dF (θ)−R(k)] < 0, k > 0.
Hence, W˜ (θˆ) is strictly quasi-concave in the domain θˆ ≥ θE .
Part (a): The marginal expected welfare is strictly negative for all θˆ ≥ θE if (13) is satisﬁed:
W˜θ(θˆ) ≤ W˜θ(θ
E) < 0. Hence, θW < θE . We already know from Lemma 1 that θW > θN . By the
stability condition (7), it follows that θW ∈ (Θ(kW ),ΘG(kW )).
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Part (b): The marginal expected welfare satisﬁes W˜θ(θ
E) ≥ 0 and W˜θ(θ¯) ≤ 0 if (13) is violated,
but (14) is satisﬁed. In this case, there exists a θW ∈ [θE , θ¯] such that W˜θ(θ
W ) = 0. As kG
is the unique welfare maximizing investment when regulation is ex post eﬃcient, it follows that
kW = K(θW ) = kG. Furthermore, θW ≥ ΘG(kW ) > Θ(kW ) by stability (7) implies that the host
country threshold for regulation is min{θW ; ΘG(kW )} = ΘG(kW ) = ΘG(kG) = θG.
Part (c): Strict concavity of the joint welfare function and W˜θ(θ¯) > 0 imply that the maximal
investment is optimal in the domain [K(θ), k¯]. Hence, the optimal level of investment protection is
θW = θ¯ in this case. 
A.6 Proof of Proposition 7
Let θ′ be given by K(θ′) ≡ kG, where the function K(θˆ) was deﬁned in Section 3 by the ﬁrst-order
condition (3). Since we are assuming an initial underinvestment, it follows that θ′ > Θ(kG). Also,
recall θG = ΘG(kG). Consider the following compensation rule, assuming θ′ < θG:
T (k, θ) =

Π(k) if θ ≤ θ′ or θ > θG and direct expropriation
Π(k) if θ ≤ θG and regulation
0 if θ′ < θ ≤ θG and direct expropriation
0 if θ > θG and regulation.
The agreement thus either pays full or no compensation, and it allows the host country to directly
expropriate, but not to regulate, without compensation for θ ≤ θ′ < θG. Assume that ﬁrms have
invested kG. For θ < θ′ the host country has to pay full compensation both under direct expro-
priation and regulation. It has no strict incentive to intervene in this case because θ′ < θG, which
is the critical value beyond which the host country is willing to pay full compensation in order to
terminate production for the investment kG. For θ′ < θ ≤ θG, the host country would prefer not to
regulate since it then has to pay full compensation. But since it can expropriate directly without
compensation, it will do so instead. For θ > θG it will regulate, and not pay any compensation.
Hence, given the investment kG production will be maintained for θ ≤ θG, which is globally eﬃcient.
Investors will not be compensated for host country measures that deprive them of their operating
proﬁts for θ > θ′, but are assured full compensation for any θ ≤ θ′. Hence, kG fulﬁlls the ﬁrst—order
condition (3).
A.7 Proof of Proposition 8
Let κ be the set of k satisfying θˆ
M
≥ Θ(k). Observe that kG ∈ κ by assumption because Θ(kG) ≤
θG ≤ θˆ
M
. It is ex post optimal for the host country to allow production for investments k ∈ κ if
and only if θ ≤ min{θˆ
M
; ΘG(k)}. Hence, the expected monopoly proﬁt equals F (θˆ
M
)Π(k)−R(k) =
Rk(k
G)
Πk(kG)
Π(k) − R(k) in the domain κ. kG is the proﬁt-maximizing investment in κ because the
expected monopoly proﬁt is strictly concave in this domain, and kG is the unique solution to the
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ﬁrst-order condition Rk(k
G)
Πk(kG)
Πk(k) − Rk(k) = 0. Let π
G ≡ Rk(k
G)
Πk(kG)
Π(kG) − R(kG). For investments
k /∈ κ, it is ex post optimal for the host country to allow production if and only if θ ≤ Θ(k). Hence,
the expected monopoly proﬁt equals F (Θ(k))Π(k) − R(k) ≤ F (θM )Π(kM ) − R(kM ) ≡ πM for all
k /∈ κ. It follows that kG maximizes the expected proﬁt for all k ≥ 0 because
πG − πM = [F (θˆ
M
)Π(kG)−R(kG)− F (θˆ
M
)Π(kM ) +R(kM )] + (F (θˆ
M
)− F (θM ))Π(kM ) ≥ 0.
The term in square brackets is non-negative because kG maximizes F (θˆ
M
)Π(k)−R(k). The second
term is non-negative by the assumption that θˆ
M
≥ θG ≥ θM . Given the equilibrium investment level
kG, it is ex post optimal for the host country to allow production if and only if θ ≤ min{θˆ
M
; θG} =
θG.
A.8 Proof of Proposition 9
Assume that compensation is paid out only if the ﬁrm is regulated and that compensation is not
allowed to be higher than Π(k). Assume also that the representative ﬁrm in the host country treats
the probability of regulation as exogenous to the own investment k. By the Revelation Principle,
we can restrict attention to direct compensation mechanisms (the host country reports θ) that are
incentive compatible (the host country cannot beneﬁt from lying about θ). A general compensation
mechanism within this framework speciﬁes a probability ξ(θ) that production is allowed and a
compensation Tˆ (k,θ) that is paid out in case the ﬁrm is regulated.
The equilibrium rent of the host country is
V (k,θ) ≡ ξ(θ)S(k,θ)− (1− ξ(θ))Tˆ (k,θ).
By standard arguments (e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991), the compensation scheme is incentive
compatible only if Vθ(k,θ) = ξ(θ)Sθ(k,θi) and ξ(θ) is non-increasing in θ. Integrating up yields the
expected rent
V (k,θ) =
Z θ
θ
ξ(θ˜)Sθ(k,θ˜)dθ˜ + V (k,θ).
The incentive compatible compensation is therefore given by
(1− ξ(θ))Tˆ (k,θ) = ξ(θ)S(k,θ)−
Z θ
θ
ξ(θ˜)Sθ(k,θ˜)dθ˜ − V (k,θ).
To make the problem economically interesting, assume that it is strictly better to allow produc-
tion than to regulate for the most favorable shock θ, so that V (k,θ) = S(k,θ). Assume also that the
mechanism does not randomize between production and regulation. Non-randomization and the
restriction that ξ(θ) is non-increasing in θ imply a threshold θˆ > θ such that ξ(θ) = 1 if θ ≤ θˆ and
ξ(θ) = 0 if θ > θˆ. We have restricted Tˆ (k,θ) to be zero for θ ≤ θˆ. If θ > θˆ, then
Tˆ (k,θ) = −
Z θˆ
θ
Sθ(k,θ˜)dθ˜ − V (k,θ) = −S(k,θˆ).
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It is impossible to implement a threshold θˆ < Θ(k) because this would imply negative compensation:
Tˆ (k,θ) = −S(k, θˆ) < −S(k,Θ(k)) = 0 for all θ ∈ (θˆ,Θ(k)).
It is also impossible to implement a threshold θˆ > ΘG(k) because doing so would require overcom-
pensating the ﬁrm,
Tˆ (k,θ) = −S(k, θˆ) > −S(k,ΘG(k)) = Π(k) for all θ > θˆ,
which we have ruled out by assumption.
Let Θ¯(k) ≡ Θ(k) if θˆ ≤ Θ(k) and Θ¯(k) ≡ min{θˆ; ΘG(k)} if θˆ > Θ(k). Then
Tˆ (k,θ) =
(
0 if θ ≤ Θ¯(k)
−S(k, Θ¯(k)) if θ > Θ¯(k)
represents the optimal payment to ﬁrms under asymmetric information about the shock θˆ.
A straightforward way to implement the cut-oﬀ Θ¯(k) and payment Tˆ (k,θ) would be to decen-
tralize the choice of regulation to the host country and require it to pay the ﬁxed compensation
−S(k, Θ¯(k)) whenever it disallows production. In this case, the net beneﬁt S(k, θ)− S(k, Θ¯(k)) of
allowing production would be non-negative if and only if θ ≤ Θ¯(k).
An alternative compensation rule that emphasizes the role of asymmetric information compared
to the optimal compensation scheme under complete information in Proposition 1, would be to
decentralize the decision to regulate to the country, but require it to report θ and pay compensation
T (k,θ) =
(
Π(k) if θ ≤ θˆ
max{−S(k, θˆ); 0} if θ > θˆ
depending on its report.
To see that this compensation scheme yields the same outcome as above, assume ﬁrst that
θˆ ≤ Θ(k). The country would always report θ > θˆ subsequent to regulation in order to pay zero
compensation: max{−S(k, θˆ); 0} = 0. As the host country would never have to pay compensation
for regulation, it would allow production for all θ ≤ Θ(k) and regulate for all θ > Θ(k).
In the second case, θˆ ∈ (Θ(k),ΘG(k)], the host country would report eθ > θˆ subsequent to
regulation because doing so would minimize the compensation payment: −S(k, θˆ) ≤ Π(k). In this
case, the net beneﬁt S(k, θ) − S(k, θˆ) of allowing production would be non-negative if and only if
θ ≤ θˆ. If θ > θˆ, then the host country would regulate, truthfully report θ and pay compensation
−S(k, θˆ) > 0.
In the third case, ΘG(k) < θˆ, the host country would minimize the compensation payment
subsequent to regulation by reporting θ˜ ≤ θˆ because Π(k) < −S(k, θˆ) in this case. The net beneﬁt
S(k, θ)+Π(k) of allowing production would be non-negative if and only if θ ≤ ΘG(k). If θ > ΘG(k),
then the host country would regulate, but perhaps misreport eθ 6= θˆ to reduce the compensation
payment to Π(k).
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A.9 A compensation scheme based on relative performance
Assume that the industry in the host country consists of H ≥ 2 symmetric foreign ﬁrms–the
results hold also for some degree of ﬁrm heterogeneity. We index ﬁrms by h 6= hˆ = 1, ...,H.
Let kh be the investment of ﬁrm h and k = (kh,k−h) the investment proﬁle of all ﬁrms, where
k−h = (k1, ..., kh−1, kh+1, ...kH) represents the investment proﬁle of all ﬁrms other than h. We
can then write demand, price, consumer surplus and so forth as functions of k. In particular,
the operating proﬁt of ﬁrm h is Πh(k) ≡ Πˆ(P (k), kh). We maintain the assumption that ﬁrms
are price-takers, so that −Ck(X(kh,k−h), kh) represents the marginal perceived eﬀect of increasing
investment kh on ﬁrm h’s operating proﬁt, where X(kh,k−h) is the production of ﬁrm h. Because
of perfect competition, each ﬁrm treats the operating proﬁt of the other ﬁrms in the industry as
constant and independent of its own investment.
The threshold function ΘG(k) for ex post eﬃcient regulation is implicitly deﬁned by
S(k,ΘG) +
PH
h=1Π
h(k) ≡ 0.
The jointly welfare maximizing investment proﬁle kG features the same investment kG by all ﬁrms
because of symmetry, and the eﬃcient threshold for regulation is θG = ΘG(kG).
Let
∆Ψ˜h(k) ≡
R ΘG(k)
θ
(Ψ(k,θ)−Ψ(0,k−h, θ))dF (θ)
be the expected externality associated with ﬁrm h’s investment if regulation is ex post eﬃcient.
Assume that Ψkhkh ≤ 0 for all h and that each ﬁrm h treats all other ﬁrms’ externality as exogenous
to the own investment kh.
39
Consider now a relative compensation scheme. A subset H(k) of all ﬁrms form a comparison
group of size |H(k)|. Let H(k) be the largest-sized comparison group such that the compensation
scheme
T h(k) =
 1|H(k)|−1
P
hˆ∈H(k)\h[Π
h(k) + ∆Ψ˜
h(k)−∆Ψ˜hˆ(k)
1−F (ΘG(k))
] ∀h ∈ H(k)
0 ∀h /∈ H(k)
(A.18)
yields non-negative compensation for all ﬁrms in the industry. Here, the compensation depends not
only on operating proﬁt, but also on the externality. For instance, the ﬁrm receives a relatively
large compensation if the externality of its investment is positive compared to that of the other
ﬁrms in the industry.40
39 Independence is a behavioral assumption here, but could be aﬀected by technology. If the externality is additive,
Ψ(k,θ) ≡
PI
h=1 Ψˆ
h(kh,θ), then ∆Ψ˜
hˆ(k) =
R θˆ
θ
[Ψˆhˆ(khˆ,θ)−Ψˆ
hˆ(0,θ)]dF (θ), which is independent of kh for all hˆ 6= h if ﬁrm
h also treats the probability θˆ of regulation as exogenous to its own investment kh.
40The compensation rule (A.18) is deﬁned only for |H(k)| ≥ 2. For completeness, assume that the ﬁrm with the
maximal Πh(k)+ ∆Ψ˜
h(k)
1−F (ΘG(k))
is compensated by Πh(k) and that the rest of the ﬁrms receive nothing in compensation
if |H(k)| = 1.
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The total payment does not involve third parties nor does it ever imply overcompensating the
industry by the host country for any possible investment proﬁle k or realization of the shock θ:PH
h=1 T
h(k) =
P
h∈H(k)Π
h(k) ≤
PH
h=1Π
h(k).
In particular, the comparison group contains the entire industry (|H(k)| = H) if the ﬁrms have
chosen similar investment levels. In this case, the host country must pay the total industry proﬁt
in compensation and therefore has an ex post eﬃcient incentive to regulate.
The expected proﬁt of ﬁrm h is
F (ΘG(k))Πh(k) + (1− F (ΘG(k)))T h(k)−R(kh)
under ex post eﬃcient regulation. Holding the threshold ﬁxed at θG, and assuming k−h = k
G
−h, the
perceived marginal eﬀect
−F (θG)Ck(X(kh,k
G
−h), kh)−Rk(kh) +
R θG
θ
Ψkh(kh,k
G
−h,θ)dF (θ)
on the expected proﬁt of increasing investment kh is exactly the same as the marginal expected
joint welfare eﬀect. By the construction of the mechanism (A.18), the host country and the ﬁrms
all internalize the full economic eﬀects of their actions.
Proposition A.6 Assume that there are H ≥ 2 identical foreign ﬁrms in the industry and that
each ﬁrms treats prices, regulation and the environmental impact of the other ﬁrms as exogenous
to the own investment. Assume also that the operating proﬁt at the eﬃcient outcome is suﬃciently
large: Π(kG) − R(kG) ≥ maxk≥0{F (θ
G)Πˆ(P (kG), k) − R(k)}. In this case, the fully eﬃcient out-
come (kG, θG) can be implemented as a Nash equilibrium by an international investment agreement
stipulating relative compensation according to (A.18).
Proof: The host country must pay the full industry proﬁt in compensation if k = kG and will
therefore allow production if and only if θ ≤ θG. Assume that k−h = k
G
−h and consider the choice
of kh under the assumption that ﬁrm h expects to be regulated with probability θ
G. By strict
concavity of the proﬁt function, kh = k
G is the proﬁt maximizing investment in the domain kh ≤ κ,
where κ > kG is the upper bound to ﬁrm h’s investment that yields a strictly positive compensation
under regulation. The expected equilibrium proﬁt Π(kG) − R(kG) by assumption is larger than
the maximum proﬁt, maxk≥0{F (θ
G)Πˆ(P (kG), k) − R(k)}, the ﬁrm could obtain if it received no
compensation. This is also a necessary condition for implementation of the fully eﬃcient outcome
under asymmetric information. Hence, kG is ﬁrm h’s proﬁt maximizing investment for all kh ≥ 0.
By continuity, the proposition holds also for some degree ﬁrm heterogeneity.
Implementation of the eﬃcient outcome is independent of any information concerning the extent
to which the host country internalizes operating proﬁt. To see this, assume that the host country
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attaches a weight γh ∈ [0, 1] to the operating proﬁt of ﬁrm h. In this case, the net beneﬁt of allowing
production equals S(kG, θ) +
PH
h=1[γhΠ
h(kG) + (1− γh)T
h(kG)] at the eﬃcient investment proﬁle
k
G. This is equal to S(kG, θ) +
PH
h=1Π
h(kG) under (A.18) and therefore independent of all γh
because T h(kG) = Πh(kG) for all h.
Proposition A.6 holds for some degree of ﬁrm heterogeneity. The important part is that ﬁrms
are suﬃciently similar that |H(kG)| = H, so that the ex post incentive to regulate is eﬃcient at kG.
Under certain conditions, the mechanism is still eﬃcient with larger ﬁrm diﬀerences. This happens
if the industry can be partitioned into multiple comparison groups with two or more similar ﬁrms
in each group, such that all of them receive positive compensation in a neighborhood around kG.
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